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Abstract
We consider a society of agents making an iterated yes/no decision on some issue, where
updating is done by mutual influence under a Markovian process. Agents update their opinions
at the same time, independently of each other, in an entirely mechanical manner. They can
have a favourable or an unfavourable perception of their neighbours. We study the qualitative
patterns of this model, which captures several notions, including conformism, anti-conformism,
communitarianism and leadership. We discuss under which conditions opinions are stable.
Finally, we introduce a notion of entropy that we use to extract information on the society and
to predict future opinions.
1 Introduction
Prior to votes, where preferences of agents are aggregated to produce a social preference (see,
e.g., Arrow (1963), Suzumura (1983)), preferences of agents interact with each other during
debates, discussions, advertisements, etc. This process, called opinion formation, is the one
studied in the present paper. It is embedded into the literature of opinion formation, diffusion
and dynamics in social networks. We consider binary opinions (yes or no, adopt or not adopt, be
active or inactive, first or second candidate, etc.), and influences among agents can be positive,
negative or null. Updating is synchronous.
One of the most prominent models of continuous opinion formation has been proposed by
DeGroot (1974) and French (1956). Many linear models have been subsequently developed,
among which Abelson (1964), Taylor (1968) and Friedkin and Johnsen (1990). One can men-
tion also Buechel et al. (2015) who introduce conformism and anti-conformism as a dishonest
report of one’s true opinion. Models of binary opinions, which have originally been studied by
physicians, are of a special interest for us since this is the framework of this article. The Ising
∗Universite´ Paris 1 Panthe´on Sorbonne. Article written within the Phd thesis at the Centre d’Economie de la
Sorbonne, ED 465, under the supervision of Michel Grabisch and Agnieszka Rusinowska. Special thanks for my
supervisors, who followed this article from the beginning to the end. Several important ideas for Theorem 2 as well
as many significant improvements are by Michel Grabisch. The author is grateful to Katarzyna Sznajd-Weron for her
insight about synchronous and asynchronous models, and Serge Galam for our several discussions, in particular, on
the effects of anti-conformism and inflexibility. Andrea Galeotti is also thanked for his remarks on congestion and
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model introduced by Lenz and Ising (1925) has been subsequently declined into numerous vari-
ants. The cellular automata were introduced by von Neumann (1966) and Ulam (1960), where
each cell updates its state, black or white, depending on its current state and the states of its
neighbours. Another significant model inspired from the Ising one is the voter model (Liggett
(1985), Liggett (1999)), introduced by Clifford and Sudbury (1973) to model the competition of
species over a spatial territory. The q-voter model (Castellano et al. (2009)) is a variant of the
voter model, where agents adopt the opinion of q neighbours. In the model of Sznajd-Weron
and Sznajd (2001), rather than being influenced by all neighbours, agents are influenced by
their neighbours agreeing with each other. In all these models, opinions are reversible, in the
sense that agents can revise their opinion and change back to their initial opinion. These models
of opinion dynamics are particularly interesting to model social phenomena. For this reason,
Galam (2008) coins the word ‘sociophysics’ to designate this hybrid field, at the intersection of
physics and economics.
In the same period as DeGroot (1974), Granovetter (1978) introduces the threshold model,
where agents become activated when the proportion of activated agents exceeds a given thresh-
old. Watts (2002) proposes a similar model of cascades in random networks. These papers
investigate the question: ‘Can an opinion initially shared by a small number of agents propa-
gate to a large part of the society?’. Models of cascades have been studied also by Banerjee
(1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992), as well as by Grabisch et al. (2019) whose model is gen-
eralised in this paper. The case of anonymous influence is meant to capture situations where
the name of agents does not matter or is not known, like opinions on the internet about the
quality of a product. It is studied by Fo¨rster et al. (2013).
Models with negative influence are of special interest for us, since this paper is an extension
of some existing models (Granovetter (1978), Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013), Fo¨rster et al.
(2013)) to negative influence, in particular, to anti-conformism. More precisely, we revisit the
general model of binary opinion dynamics with aggregation functions (Grabisch, 2016) pre-
sented in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013), where all agents are conformists. Galam (2004) and
Galam and Jacobs (2007) encompass anti-conformist and inflexible agents to the initial model of
presidential election by successive elections of representatives (Galam, 1986). In the same vein,
Nyczka and Sznajd-Weron (2013) and Nyczka et al. (2012) propose q-voter models with anti-
conformist and independent agents. An extension of Fo¨rster et al. (2013) to negative influence is
proposed by Grabisch et al. (2019). An adaptation of the Granovetter model by including anti-
conformist agents is proposed by Grabisch and Li (2019). We can also mention Jull and Porter
(2019), where adoption is irreversible and agents can be either conformists or anti-conformists,
with some probability. Touboul (2014) mixes conformist and anti-conformist agents, called
hipsters, with information delays, and the literature on coordination and anti-coordination.
Notable models are Morris (2000) who proposes a local game investigating contagion in a net-
work where agents have an interest to coordinate. Bramoulle´ et al. (2004), Bramoulle´ (2007)
and Lo´pez-Pintado (2009) study models of anti-coordination, where agents are inclined to play
different actions like in the chicken game.
The aim of this paper is to propose a general model of binary opinion updating, where any
kind of positive and negative influences are allowed. The model that we introduce is based on
aggregation functions, in the vein of Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013), of which this paper is an
extension, by including negative influence. Any kind of opinion updating is a particular case
of our model, provided that: (i) alternatives are binary; (ii) decision making is reversible; (iii)
updating is synchronous and (iv) the process is Markovian; (v) aggregation functions are fixed.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 exposes the model. It first recalls the main
tools introduced in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013). Section 2.2 introduces several tools which
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permit to treat negative influence. We show that negative influence can be treated in the
same manner as the positive one, by choosing an appropriate pre-order on states. Section
2.3 proposes a coalitional analysis, where the yes and no-influential coalitions introduced in
Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013) are generalised to negative influence. These coalitions are
shown to exhaustively describe the qualitative pattens of the model. Section 3 introduces
a non-topological notion of groups. Contrary to the literature on networks which considers
degrees, cliques, conventions (Jackson and Storms (2018)), etc., our notion of group is purely
based on the signs of influence: two agents belong to the same group if they receive the same
influences. The definition allows for a hide variety of topologies among a given group. This
tractability allows to consider groups from a social point of view, that is, large networks of agents
that do not necessarily know each other but share the same beliefs and the same influences in
the large sense. Moreover, this section investigates relations between four classes of models,
namely, conformism, leadership, communitarian (anti-coordination) and mixed model (with
anti-conformist agents). We show that simple relations exist between these models, but we
can split them between two categories associated to different dynamics. The conformist and
the communitarian societies on the one hand, and the leadership and the mixed societies on
the other hand, produce the same dynamics. In Section 4 we give several sufficient conditions
to ensure stability of opinions. Section 5 introduces an index of entropy, which captures a
certain notion of disorder by counting what we call ‘abnormalities’. We use entropy to define
the notion of natural dynamics and to explain why some societies are more prone than others to
opinion fluctuations. We introduce in Section 5.3 the minimal entropy principle, which is used
in a similar manner as the maximum likelihood principle. Based on our notion of groups, an
observer first assumes a certain type of society of which it recovers the parameters by minimising
the number of abnormalities. Observing some times series of opinions, the observer can use the
minimal entropy principle to recover information of the society and predict future opinions.
2 Description of the model
2.1 Generalities
We consider a set N := {1, . . . , n} of agents making an iterated yes-no decision on some issue.
Each agent starts from an initial opinion and updates it due to mutual influence. Decisions are
taken simultaneously by agents on the basis of the current state of the world S, simply called
state, being the set of agents whose opinion is yes. We use the following convention: ‘Yes’ is
coded by 1 and ‘No’ by 0. We write by 1S the indicator function of S, i.e., 1S(i) = 1 if i ∈ S
and 0 otherwise. Given the state S of the society, the probability that the next state is T is
written by bS,T . Assuming that the process iterates, we obtain a stochastic process, called an
influence process. The process is assumed to be: (i) Markovian, i.e, bS,T only depends on S
and T , and not on the whole history of the process; (ii) stationary, i.e., time does not appear in
the computation of bS,T . We compute bS,T from the probabilities pi(S) of each agent i to say
yes when the current state is S. If these probabilities are independent among agents, as it is
assumed in this paper, then we have:
bS,T =
∏
i∈T
pi(S)
∏
i6∈T
(1− pi(S)). (1)
We propose a qualitative description of the process described by the 2n × 2n row-stochastic
transition matrix B := [bS,T ]S,T⊆N , that is, we examine the absorbing classes and their type
3
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(for example, whether they are periodic or not). For this reason, we define the reduced matrix
B˜, where:
b˜S,T =
{
1 if bS,T > 0
0 if bS,T = 0
(2)
When bS,T > 0, we also write S → T . If bS,T = 1, we write S 1→ T . The reduced matrix can be
equivalently represented by a transition graph Γ˜ = (2N , E), where E is the set of directed arcs
(S, T ), and an arc exists if and only if b˜S,T = 1. We will also use the weighted transition graph
Γ = (2N , E,B), where each arc (S, T ) has weight bS,T .
Opinion updating is based on aggregation functions (Grabisch, 2016), which aggregate in a
single number the opinions of all agents.
Definition 1. The aggregation function Ai of agent i is a mapping from {0, 1}n to [0, 1]. We
denote by A := (Ai)i=1,..,n the vector of aggregation functions for all agents 1, . . . , n.
The previous definition of an aggregation function does not impose any monotonicity con-
ditions. Usually, Ai is assumed to be increasing (e.g, in the voter model or in Grabisch and
Rusinowska (2013)). However, our model aims precisely at dealing also with negative influence.
For this reason, we adopt a more general definition.
We identify the result of the aggregation function to the probability of saying yes: pi(S) :=
Ai(1S). When the state of the society is S, the next state is given by the realisation of n
Bernoulli random variables, like in Asavathiratham (2000) and Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013).
Our model is therefore not deterministic (while, for example, the DeGroot model is). That is,
agents aggregate first, and then toss a coin according to this probability, in order to take the
decision to say yes or no.
Remark 1. If Ai(1S) = 1 − Ai(1Sc) for all S, agent i treats in the same way the ‘yes’ and
‘no’ opinions, i.e., it is unbiased toward the word ‘yes’ or the word ‘no’ (otherwise, it is called
‘biased’). Assuming that aggregation functions are unbiased can be relevant to model elections
for a candidate (but still, a biased aggregation function is some kind of political orientation),
but not to model adoption of a new technology, in which case there is an investment cost.
Aggregation functions representing majority influence, for example, are unbiased.
By the identification above, Equation (1) can be rewritten:
bS,T =
∏
i∈T
Ai(1S)
∏
i6∈T
(1−Ai(1S)). (3)
Conversely, the weighted transition graph characterises A, as stated by the following prop-
erty:
Property 1. A and B are isomorphic.
Proof. Proofs are given in appendix.
When needed, we will mention the vector of aggregation functions in superscript: ΓA or
simply Ai when the object depends on the characteristics of a single agent.
A function taking values in {0, 1} is called Boolean.
We introduce some notations relative to sets. For two sets A ⊆ B in 2N , we write
[A,B] := {S | A ⊆ S ⊆ B}. A collection of this form is called an interval. The cardinality of a
set is denoted by the corresponding lower case, e.g., s = |S|. The symmetric difference ∆ on sets
S1 and S2 is defined by S1∆S2 := (S1 ∪S2) \ (S1 ∩S2) = (S1 \S2)∪ (S2 \S1). The complement
4
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set of S is written Sc. If P := {S1, . . . , Sk} is a collection of sets, we write P(c) := {Sc1, . . . , Sck}
and Pc := 2N \ P. We write also P∆(Z) := {S1∆Z, . . . Sk∆Z}. The intersection (respectively
union) of all the elements of a collection P is written by ⋂P (respectively ⋃P). For a mapping
f defined on sets and P a collection of sets, we write f(P) = {f(S) | S ∈ P}.
We recall some basic notions of Markov chains. Let C be a nonempty collection of states. C
is strongly connected if either it is of the form C = {S}, or for every distinct S, T ∈ C, there is a
path in C from S to T . Moreover, C is a class if it is strongly connected and maximal for this
property, i.e., if no super-collection of C is strongly connected. It is absorbing if there is no arc
from some S ∈ C to some T /∈ C. An absorbing state S is one such that S 1→ S. An absorbing
class is periodic if for some k ≥ 2 there exists a partition {P1, . . . , Pk} of C such that when the
process is at a state belonging to Pi at time t, then it will be in a state of Pi+1 at time t + 1,
with Pk+1 := P1. When each Pi reduces to a single state, we refer to the periodic class as a
cycle.
When the sets S need to be explicit, we index agents by numbers. A common convention
ignores the curly brackets and commas. For example, {1, 2, 3} can be written 123.
Theorem 1 below gives the shape of absorbing classes. This theorem does not involve any
assumption on aggregation functions.
Theorem 1. (Grabisch and Rusinowska, 2013)
Consider an influence process based on aggregation functions A. Absorbing classes are:
(i) either singletons (absorbing states) {S}, S ∈ 2N ,
(ii) or cycles: S1
1→ S2 1→ . . . 1→ Sk 1→ S1,
(iii) or collections C = C1 ∪ · · · ∪ Cp, where each collection Cj is an interval [Sj , Sj ∪Kj ] with at
least one nonempty Kj .
In particular, if all aggregation functions are Boolean, absorbing classes are absorbing states
or cycles. Collections Ci in absorbing classes of the third kind are not necessarily pairwise
disjoint, but they must be so if the transitions are sure from one Ci to another (periodic classes).
Absorbing classes of the third kind are either aperiodic classes, or periodic classes with at least
one interval. In the sequel, we will refer to the dynamics of a society as being the kind of
absorbing classes reached: (i), (ii) or (iii).
Let us see an example involving the notions introduced so far.
Example 1. Let N = 123. The aggregation functions characterised by the values taken on the
2n states are represented with coloured lattices. The resulting transition graph Γ˜ is represented
in yellow, at the bottom-right of Figure 1. We observe that the state 12 is absorbing (12
1→ 12)
and that it is the unique absorbing class. The probabilities of transitions above the arrows of
the transition graph Γ˜ can be computed from (1). For example: b23,12 = 1 · 23 · (1− 0) = 23 .
Another example is given in Figure 9, where a cycle appears: 1
1→ 23 1→ 1.
2.2 Modelling positive and negative influence
So far we have not imposed any conditions on aggregation functions. In particular, aggregation
functions are not necessarily monotonous in each entry. In order to introduce a new kind of
monotonicity, we introduce the following 4B order, which is the specific tool of this paper.
5
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Agent 1 Agent 2
Agent 3
1 12 2 33
13 1323 12
123 123
12 23
∅ ∅
1 12 23 3
13 1323 12
123 123
12 23
∅ ∅
Three aggregation functions represented with coloured lattices
Ai(1S) = 1 at green states. Ai(1S) =
2
3
at blue states.
Ai(1S) =
1
3
at cyan states. Ai(1S) = 0 at red states.
Figure 1: From the aggregation functions to the transition graph (boxed)
2.2.1 The partial order 4B
Definition 2. (Partial order 4B)
Let S, S′, B ∈ 2N . We define the 4B partial order (or simply the 4B order) on sets by:
S1 4B S2 ⇔
{
S1 ∩B ⊆ S2 ∩B
S1 ∩Bc ⊇ S2 ∩Bc (4)
and S1 ≺B S2 if at least one of these two inclusions is strict.
That is, S1 4B S2 if S1 is a subset of S2 within B, and a superset of S2 outside B (S2
is more engaged into B than S1). 4N is the usual set order ⊆, while 4∅ is the reverse set
order ⊇. S1 4B S2 is illustrated below. We note that S1 4B S2 ⇔ Sc2 4B Sc1 and that
S1 4B S2 ⇔ B 4S1 S2.
BBc
S2S1
Figure 2: Illustration of S1 4B S2: S2 is more engaged into B than S1.
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Let us introduce the mapping:
fB :
{
2N → 2N
S 7→ S∆Bc (5)
It is a bijection from 2N onto itself. Note that fN = id and that f∅ transforms each set into its
complement. Importantly, 2N endowed with the partial order 4B is a lattice LB := (2N ,4B),
with top element and bottom elements B and Bc, and with infimum and supremum ∧B, ∨B
given for any S, T ∈ 2N by:
S ∧B T := [(S ∩ T ) ∩B] ∪ [(S ∪ T ) ∩Bc] (6)
S ∨B T := [(S ∪ T ) ∩B] ∪ [(S ∩ T ) ∩Bc] (7)
For ∧B, we take the intersection within B and the union outside B. For ∨B, we take the
union within B and the intersection outside B (see Figure 3). ∧B and ∨B coincide with ∩ and ∪
when B = N . The upset and downset of a given set S under the partial order 4B, respectively
denoted by {S′ | S 4B S′} and {S′ | S <B S′}, are shortly written ↑B S and ↓B S. If B = N ,
we simply denote them by ↑ S (= [S,N ]) and ↓ S (= [∅, S]).
S2
S1 S1
S2
S1 ∧B S2 S1 ∨B S2
B B
BcBc
Figure 3: Infimum and supremum
fB is a lattice isomorphism from LN = (2N ,⊆) to LB = (2N ,4B). Indeed, for any S, S′ ∈
2N :
fB(S ∩ S′) = fB(S) ∧B fB(S′) (8)
and
fB(S ∪ S′) = fB(S) ∨B fB(S′) (9)
Note that: (i) fB(∅) = Bc; (ii) fB(N) = B (bounded-lattice properties) and that we can
write
S1 4B S2 ⇔ f−1B (S1) ⊆ f−1B (S2)⇔ fB(S1) ⊆ fB(S2) (10)
where the first equivalence comes from the fact that fB is a lattice isomorphism and the
second equivalence comes from the fact that fB is an involution: fB ◦ fB = id.
A chain is a sub-collection of 2N , totally ordered with respect to 4B, while an antichain is
a sub-collection of 2N whose elements are pairwise incomparable with respect to 4B. In this
paper, any chain (respectively antichain) is implicitly taken maximal, i.e., such that there exists
no chain (respectively antichain) that strictly contains it.
7
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2.2.2 Monotonicity collections and related notions
We now introduce another basic ingredient of our paper.
Definition 3. (Monotonicity collectionMi) Let Ai be the aggregation function of agent i. We
define the monotonicity collection Mi as follows: B ∈ Mi if and only if S 4B S′ ⇒ Ai(1S) ≤
Ai(1S′).
An agent i such that B ∈Mi says yes with a higher probability when more agents in B say
yes, and less agents outside B say yes. Roughly speaking, agent i is positively influenced by
agents in B and negatively by agents outside B. Let us see two important particular cases.
Example 2. (Conformism, Anti-conformism).
• (Conformism). An agent i is said to be conformist if N ∈ Mi, that is, if for all S, S′
with S 4N S′ (i.e., S ⊆ S′), it holds that Ai(1S) ≤ Ai(1S′) (i.e., Ai is non decreasing).
Conformist agents are those who say “yes” when more agents say “yes” (“more” in the
inclusion sense).
• (Anti-conformism). An agent i is said to be anti-conformist if ∅ ∈ Mi, that is, if for all
S, S′ with S 4∅ S′ (i.e., S ⊇ S′), it holds that Ai(1S) ≤ Ai(1S′) (i.e., Ai is non increasing).
Anti-conformist agents are those who say “yes” when more agents say “no” (“more” in
the inclusion sense).
Property 2 below gives the monotonicity collection of the aggregation function obtained by
relabelling the states with the transformation fB.
Property 2. (‘Rotation’ of the lattice) Assume that Ai is such that B ∈Mi. Then, the aggre-
gation function A′i with monotonicity collection M′i, obtained from Ai by A′i(1S) := Ai(1fB(S))
for all S ∈ 2N , is such that N ∈M′i.
In what follows, we speak of conformist polarisation if all agents in the society are conformists
(studied in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013)), and we speak of anti-conformist polarisation if
all agents of the society are anti-conformists. More generally, a polarisation is a collection of
monotonicity collections for all agents.
Definition 4. The polarisation of A (or the ‘polarisation of the society’) is the collection
(Mi)i∈N .
Note thatMi = ∅ (see Example 3) is different fromMi = {∅} (which represents a particular
case of anti-conformism).
The essential Property 3 below establishes the equivalence between the non-emptiness of
Mi and the independence of the signs of influence on the state of the world. Mi 6= ∅ means
that there exists B such that S 4B S′ ⇒ Ai(1S) ≤ Ai(1S′), depending on whether j ∈ B or
j /∈ B, j’s contribution to the opinion of agent i is either always positive or always negative.
This property is important to make the subsequent Definition 5 meaningful.
Property 3. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) Mi 6= ∅.
(ii) For any j ∈ N , either Ai(1S∪j) ≥ Ai(1S) for all S, or Ai(1S∪j) ≤ Ai(1S) for all S ∈ 2N .
8
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The following influence index is used to tell the nature of the influence (positive, negative
or null) of a given agent on another one. Our analysis being exclusively qualitative, only the
signs of influence matter for us. Property 3 justifies the absence of coefficients in front of the
terms (Ai(1S∪j)− Ai(1S)). This index really makes sense when Mi 6= ∅, even though it would
remain well defined otherwise.
Definition 5. (Influence index) Let i, j ∈ N . We define the influence index of j on i as follows:
φ(j → i) :=
∑
S⊆N\j
(Ai(1S∪j)−Ai(1S)). (11)
If φ(j → i) > 0 (respectively <, =), j is said to have a positive (respectively negative,
null) influence on i. We also say that an agent having null influence on i is irrelevant for this
agent. In particular, under the assumption that Mi 6= ∅ for all i, we get from Property 3 that
φ(j → i) = 0⇔ Ai(1S) = Ai(1S∪j) for all S ∈ 2N .
The influence index reflects the qualitative influence relations between agents. We now
define the graph of influence. There is an arrow from j to i if φ(j → i) 6= 0, either positive or
negative1.
Definition 6. The influence graph is G := (N, E) where the set of arcs E is such that there is
an arc from j to i if and only if φ(j → i) 6= 0.
Having established in Proposition 3 the equivalence between the non-emptiness of the mono-
tonicity collection and the possibility to build an influence index which makes sense, let us see
in Example 3 some examples of empty monotonicity collections.
Example 3. (Examples of empty Mi: congestion, saturation)
Let Ai(1S) = s(n − s) for all S. Then for any j, Ai(1S∪j) ≥ Ai(1S) for s ≤ n2 − 1 and
Ai(1S∪j) ≤ Ai(1S) for s ≥ n2 . Because of the existence of j which i considers positively or
negatively depending on the state of the world (only one suffices), agent i is such thatMi = ∅.
When all agents have this aggregation function, we get a model of saturation or congestion:
agents are conformists or anti-conformists depending on the state of the world. This corresponds
to situations like the frequentation of a restaurant. When there are not too many people in
the restaurant, the dominant effect is the herd behaviour, since agents guess the quality of the
restaurant from the number of clients. But when there are too many people, the congestion
effect dominates. Since the restaurant gets noisy, the waiter is overwhelmed and service gets
slow, etc., people do not choose the restaurant anymore.
Another example of agent i such that Mi = ∅ is an agent having a low self-esteem. It is
positively influenced by itself when a lot of people share his opinion and negatively influenced
by himself when few people share his opinion. One can think also of diplomatic or ethological
situations, where peers can be friends in some states of the world, and enemies in other states
of the world. The intricacies of friendships usually evolve depending on the presence of third
parts. For example, mafias or nations which compete over small pieces of territory can unite
against a common enemy. These situations will be excluded in this paper, as they would require
a totally different mathematical treatment.
1Note that when negative influence is introduced, the topology of the influence graph and the influences do not
coincide anymore. This implies that the common approach of centrality, betweenness, cliques, etc. are not applicable,
or they must be taken at two separate levels. in our paper, we will not use any notion of centrality, though.
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The previous examples are rather far-fetched. Hence, the following assumption is reasonable:
Assumption. From now on, we assume that Mi 6= ∅ for all i.
Theorem 2 below is used all through the article. It states that the collection Mi is an
interval which can be expressed with the influence index. Agents in Bi exert a strict positive
influence on i. Agents in (Bi)
c exert a strict negative influence on i. Agents in Bi \ Bi are
irrelevant. The baseline set of Mi is Bi and we can add some irrelevant agents to Bi.
Theorem 2. Mi = [Bi, Bi] where
Bi :=
⋂
B∈Mi
B = {j ∈ N | φ(j → i) > 0} (12)
Bi :=
⋃
B∈Mi
B = {j ∈ N | φ(j → i) ≥ 0} (13)
Mi has only one element if and only if there exists no agent having a null influence on i,
e.g., when it has a distance-based aggregation function (see Definition 10).
We can characterise conformism and anti-conformism (see Example 2) as follows:
i is a conformist agent⇔ N ∈Mi ⇔ Bi = N (14)
i is an anti-conformist agent⇔ ∅ ∈Mi ⇔ Bi = ∅ (15)
That is, an agent is conformist (respectively anti-conformist) if and only if no agent has a
strictly negative (respectively strictly positive) influence on it.
Here are a few other examples of monotonicity collections.
Example 4. (Monotonicity collections) In Figure 1, M1 = {2}, M2 = {123} (conformist
agent) and M3 = {∅, 1} (anti-conformist agent). Note that Agent 1 is not conformist. Indeed,
N /∈ Mi, even though Ai(1N ) = 1. In Figure 5, Mi = {123}. In Figure 9, M1 = {123},
M2 =M2 = {∅}.
Assumption BC naturally completes the assumption on the non-emptiness of monotonicity
collections. It is not assumed by default in this paper. Note, in particular, that it is not an
assumption of Theorem 2.
Assumption BC. For any i and B ∈Mi:
• Ai(1B) = 1,
• Ai(1Bc) = 0.
Agents obeying to Assumption BC cannot be such that Ai(1S) = c for all S (always tossing
a coin). In Figure 1 with Agent 1, we have {2} ∈ M1, A1(12) = 1 and A1(113) = 0, and
therefore Assumption BC holds. With Agent 2, we have N ∈M2, A2(1N ) = 1 and A2(1∅) = 0,
and therefore Assumption BC holds. With Agent 3, Assumption BC holds as well.
10
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Example 5. [Anonymous influence] Let 0 ≤ s ≤ n be the cardinality of the state S and pi(s)
the probability for agent i to say “yes” at the next period when the state is S. In Grabisch
et al. (2019), two classes of aggregation functions are focused on:
Qc := {p | p is nondecreasing and satisfies p(0) = 0 and p(n) = 1} (16)
Qa := {p | p is nonincreasing and satisfies p(0) = 1 and p(n) = 0} (17)
Agents aggregating according to Ai ≡ pc ∈ Qc are conformist, those aggregating according
to Ai ≡ pa ∈ Qa are anti-conformist (see Example 2); the coexistence of agents of these two
groups corresponds to the mixed polarisation (or mixed society) in Section 3.2 (see Figure 9). 2
2.2.3 The P0i and P1i collections
The collections P1i and P0i defined hereafter are fundamental objects for studying an influence
process qualitatively. These are the collections such that the agent i says yes or no for sure.
Definition 7. Let i ∈ N . We introduce:
P1i := {S | Ai(1S) = 1}. (18)
P0i := {S | Ai(1S) = 0}. (19)
P∗i := 2N \ (P0i ∪ P1i ) = {S | 0 < Ai(1S) < 1}. (20)
Ai is Boolean if and only if P∗i = ∅. Boolean aggregation functions are entirely defined with
P1i (or P0i ). When Assumption BC holds, Mi ⊆ P1i . When aggregation functions are Boolean,
equality holds if and only if P1i is an interval.
Example 6. (Intervals) In Figure 1, the P1i collections are represented in green, the P0i col-
lections are represented in red, and P∗i corresponds to the blue and cyan states. Agents 1 and
3 have Boolean aggregation functions. P13 is an interval, P03 is not. Neither P01 nor P11 is an
interval. P12 and P02 are intervals.
When Ai is Boolean, intervals for P1i and/or P0i can be interpreted in terms of ‘boss sets’
(Hu and Shapley (2003a) and Hu and Shapley (2003b)).
Definition 8. (Boss sets) We say that K is a boss set for i if and only if i,K verify one of the
following situations:
(i) P1i = [K,N ] =↑ K.
i says yes for sure if and only if all agents of K say yes. In other words K ⊆ S ⇔ Ai(S) = 1.
(ii) P1i = [∅,K] =↓ K.
i says yes for sure if and only if no agent outside K says yes. In other words, S ⊆ K ⇔
Ai(S) = 1.
(iii) P0i = [K,N ] =↑ K.
i says no for sure if and only if all agents of K say yes. In other words, S ⊆ K ⇔ Ai(S) = 0.
2The reader is maybe expecting some considerations about nested or pairwise disjointsMi. While certainly essential
in quantitative models, it seems that little information can be extracted in general from these considerations. Though
disjoint Mi have an interpretation in terms of groups (Section 3), and nested Mi have an interpretation in terms of
groups also and in terms of entropy (Section 5), such considerations are not essential in our model.
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(iv) P0i = [∅,K] =↓ K.
i says no for sure if and only if no agent outside K says yes. In other words, K ⊆ S ⇔
Ai(S) = 0.
. If K = {j}, we say that j is a boss for i.
A stubborn agent can be defined as being a boss for himself: he only considers his own
opinion.
The following property is straightforward.
Property 4. B˜ and (P0i ,P1i )i∈N are isomorphic.
It follows from Property 4 that knowing (P0i ,P1i )i∈N is sufficient to compute the absorbing
classes. The converse, however, is wrong.
See Section 2.4.(i) to (viii) for a summary of the paper until now.
2.3 Coalitional analysis
In order to capture the qualitative patters of the influence process, the ‘boundaries’ of P0i and
P1i , Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013) propose the concepts of yes and no-influential coalitions
in a conformist polarisation. (See also Grabisch and Rusinowska (2016), where the authors
propose an algorithm to identify these coalitions).
Definition. (Conformist polarisation, Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013)) Assume that the
polarisation of the society is conformist.
• A set S is a yes-influential coalition on i ∈ N if: Ai(1S) > 0 and ∀S′ ⊂ S, Ai(1S′) = 0.
• A set S is a no-influential coalition on i ∈ N if: Ai(1Sc) < 1 and ∀S′ ⊂ S, Ai(1S′c) = 1.
The yes-influential coalitions describe the borders of P0i . In the previous definition, a set
S is a yes-influential coalition on i if the latter has some probability to say yes when agents
in S say yes. This set is minimal in the sense that removing any agent from S leads agent
i to say no for sure. The no-influential coalitions describe the borders of P1i . A coalition is
no-influential on i if the latter has some probability to say no when agents of the coalition S
are saying no. Removing any agent of S leads agent i to say yes for sure. In some sense, a yes
or a no-influential coalition is decisive for agent i.
Figure 5 illustrates these definitions. The symmetric difference of two sets linked in blue is a
yes influential coalition. The aggregation function represented is the one of a conformist agent,
i.e., Bi = N . We have for example ∅∆23 = 23 ∈ Yi since Ai(123) > 0 and Ai(1S) = 0 for any
S ⊂ 23. In a conformist aggregation function, the yes influential coalitions coincide with sets.
This notion extends well to our general framework.
Definition 9. (General definition) Let i ∈ N .
A set S is a yes-influential coalition on i ∈ N if:
• Ai(1fBi (S)) > 0,
• Ai(1fBi (S′)) = 0 for all S
′ ⊂ S.
A set S is a no-influential coalition on i ∈ N if:
• Ai(1fBci (S)) < 1,
12
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• Ai(1fBci (S′)) = 1 for all S
′ ⊂ S.
The collections of yes and no-influential coalitions on i are denoted by Yi and Ni. 3 4
The interpretation of yes and no-influential coalitions in the general model is essentially the
same as in the conformist polarisation. We represent in Figure 4 below, a coalition S ∈ Yi
(similar reasoning and picture for the no-influential coalitions). Let us write T := B
c
i∆S (since
S is typically close to ∅, T is typically close to Bci ). Then, Ai(1T ) > 0 by definition of a yes-
influential coalition. If we take S ⊂ S′, then either the part of T inside Bi is smaller, or its part
outside Bi is bigger. The inclination of the agent to say yes disappears.
Bi
S
T
Figure 4: A yes or a no-influential coalition S
Property 5. Assume that Assumption BC holds. Then:⋃
Yi ∪
⋃
Ni ⊆ {j | φ(j → i) 6= 0} (= Bi ∪Bci ) (21)
When Ai is Boolean, equality holds.
The reverse inclusion of Property 5 does not hold in general, as Example 7 shows.
Example 7. Let P1i = [1, 123], P0i = {∅, 2}, Ai(13) = 12 and Ai(123) = 34 . Then Yi = {{1}, {3}}
and Ni = {{1}}. However, φ(2→ i) 6= 0.
Since (P0i ,P1i )i∈N and B˜ are isomorphic, the other isomorphism established in Theorem 3
tells us that (Yi,Ni)i∈N is isomorphic to B˜ as well. Theorem 3 is illustrated by Figure 5.
Theorem 3. (Properties of Yi andNi) Yi (respectivelyNi) and P0i (respectively P1i ) correspond
bijectively.5
3The reader might wonder why the definition has been stated with Bi rather than any other B ∈Mi. The answer
is that it would be actually possible, because yes and no-influential coalitions contain no irrelevant agents on i. This
is stated by Property 5. See also Figure 5.
4We must be careful with the terminology: a yes influential coalition is not a set of agents exerting a positive
influence, and a no-influential coalition is not a set of agents exerting a negative influence. Assume that Ai is
such that B ∈ Mi and let the aggregation function A′i with monotonicity collection M′i be obtained from Ai by:
A′i(1S) := Ai(1fB(S)). Since for all Y,M,B ∈ 2N we have ∅∆fB(Bc∆Y ) = Y and N∆fB(B∆M) = M , the yes and
no-influential coalitions of Ai and A
′
i are identical. Therefore, the yes and no-influential coalitions have nothing to do
with Mi.
5Despite that Yi corresponds bijectively to P0i , the yes-influential coalitions do not ‘cover’ P0i , in the sense that
the collection inclusion P0i ⊂
⋃
S∈Yi
↓Bi fBi(S) is wrong. This can be seen in Figure 5. The state 12 is not ‘below’ any
yes-influential coalition: there exists no S ∈ Yi such that 12 ⊂ S. The same remark holds for no-influential coalitions.
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1 2 3
1312
123Bi =
23
∅(Bi)c =
Yi = {13, 23}
P0i in red, P1i in green
Figure 5: Theorem 3: Yi (blue) and P0i (red) correspond bijectively.
We now want to localise the yes and no-influential coalitions from the transition graph. The
first point of Theorem 4 below is adapted from Theorem 1 in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013).
When the considered transition is sure, then the second point of the theorem brings a precision
to the first point. It generalises Lemma 4 in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013).
Theorem 4. Assume that Assumption BC holds.
(1) (From B˜ to (Yi,Ni))
For all S, T ∈ 2N , b˜S,T = 1 if and only if:
– For each i ∈ T , there exists a non-empty Y ⊆ S∆Bci (where Bi ∈Mi) such that Y is
yes-influential on i and
– For each i /∈ T , there exists a nonempty M ⊆ S∆Bi (where Bi ∈ Mi) such that M
is no-influential on i.
(2) (From B to (Yi,Ni))
Suppose that S
1→ T . Then, there cannot be a yes-influential coalition Y ⊆ S∆Bci on i
(where Bi ∈ Mi) if i /∈ T , or a no-influential coalition M ⊆ S∆Bi on i (where Bi ∈ Mi)
if i ∈ T .
Since we already know that B˜, (P0i ,P1i )i∈N and (Yi,Ni)i∈N correspond bijectively, the pos-
sibility to extract (Yi,Ni)i∈N directly from B˜ (without using (Pi,Pi)i∈N ) is not a new property,
but a mere shortcut.
2.4 Summary of the notions introduced
At this stage, let us draw a summary of the notions introduced and their relations:
(i) The primitive data of the model is the vector of aggregation functions A = (Ai)i∈N .
(ii) From A, we extract the transition graph B = (bS,T )S,T∈2N :
bS,T =
∏
i∈T
Ai(1S)
∏
i6∈T
(1−Ai(1S)).
(iii) A and B are isomorphic. That is, B could also be primitive of the model.
(iv) Absorbing classes are obtained from B˜.
14
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(v) We define the 4B order and the influence index φ:
φ(j → i) =
∑
S⊆N\j
[Ai(1S∪j)−Ai(1S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
same sign ∀S
].
. If φ(j → i) = 0, j is said to be irrelevant on i.
(vi) The monotonicity collections Mi are extracted from the aggregation functions Ai. It
determines which agent has positive or negative influence on i.
B ∈Mi if and only if for any S, S′ ∈ 2N :
S 4B S′ ⇒ Ai(1S) ≤ Ai(1S′)
We assume that Mi 6= ∅ for all i (same sign ∀S in the sum of φ).
(vii) We express the interval Mi in terms of influence indices φ(j → i):
Mi = [Bi, Bi]
where Bi :=
⋂
B∈Mi
B = {j ∈ N | φ(j → i) > 0} and Bi := Bi ∪Ki and Ki the set of irrel-
evant agents on i.
(viii) (P0i ,P1i )i∈N are obtained from Ai:
P1i := {S | Ai(1S) = 1}
and
P0i := {S | Ai(1S) = 0}
(ix) From (P0i ,P1i )i∈N , we extract (Yi,Ni)i∈N :
• S is yes-influential on i if and only if Ai(1fBi (S)) > 0 and Ai(1fBi (S′)) = 0 for any
S′ ⊂ S.
• S is no-influential on i if and only if Ai(1fBci (S′)) < 1 and Ai(1fBci (S′)) = 1 for any
S′ ⊂ S.
These coalitions do not contain irrelevant agents.
(x) B˜, (P0i ,P1i )i∈N and (Yi,Ni)i∈N correspond bijectively.
sign(φ(j → i))
Mi A
B B˜
P0i ,P1i Yi,Ni
absorbing classes
Figure 6: Summary and relations between the introduced notions
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2.5 Special cases
2.5.1 Self-influence
A natural idea is that agents positively weigh their own opinion, i.e., they “agree with them-
selves”. Assumption SI formalises this idea, but is not assumed by default in this paper.
Assumption SI: i ∈ Bi for all i.
Assumption SI means that all agent have a strict influence on themselves. Equivalently
(Proposition 3), for all i, there exists S ∈ N \ i such that Ai(1S) < Ai(1S∪i). 6
Though Assumption SI sounds very natural, it might be relevant, in some contexts, to
assume that φ(i→ i) < 0. Here are a few examples.
• Like in SIR models, ‘saying yes’ can be seen as ‘being infected’. Stating φ(i → i) < 0
allows to model the recovery from the disease. More generally, it can model an excitation
which calls for a subsequent inhibition in a biologic cycle.
• ‘Saying yes’ can be ‘passing on a piece of information’. If there is a cost for passing the
information, then the agent will convey the information for one or a few periods, until
enough people received it. Then, it will stop.
• From a psychological point of view, a vote can be the acquisition of an object, and failure of
Assumption SI would model state-dependant utility, where utility for the object decreases
once we acquire it (see Girard (1966), Girard (1977)).
• From a managerial point of view, a vote can be a check of the quality of a product in the
fabrication process. An agent probing the product at time t needs not probe it again at
time t+ 1. An agent anti-coordinates on himself when he gains from spreading his action
over time rather than concentrating on a contained period.
We expect Assumption SI to be linked to issues of stability, which are of particular interest
for us. It is indeed involved in some sufficient conditions to forbid cycles (Proposition 3 in
Section 4).
2.5.2 Distance-based aggregation functions and Generalised Weighted Means
We first define the distance-based aggregation functions. They generalise the notion of anony-
mous influence (Example 5). An aggregation function is distance-based if there exists a pole
T such that two states S, S′ differing from T by the same number of elements are such that
Ai(1S) = Ai(1S′).
Definition 10. Ai is said to be distance-based if there exists a state T , called a pole, such that:
|S∆T | = |S′∆T | ⇒ Ai(1S) = Ai(1S′). If the aggregation function takes its highest value on T ,
then T is called the pole of Ai.
7
Distance-based aggregation functions have a unique pole. If the agent is conformist or
anti-conformist, a distance-based aggregation function is anonymous. In Example 5, the pole
of Ai ≡ p ∈ Qc is N ; the pole of Ai ≡ p ∈ Qa is ∅. See Figures 7 and 9 for examples of
6One might prefer, as a weaker assumption, to assume that i ∈ Bi for all i (agents do not have a strict negative
influence on themselves), but our convention is easier to work with in Proposition 3.
7In this case, note that Mi = {T}.
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distance-based aggregation functions. We introduce the following notation, which will be used
in Sections 4 and 5:
Vr(T ) := {S : |S∆T | ≤ r}. (22)
Note that distance-based aggregation functions have P0i and P1i of the form P1i = Vr1(T )
and P0i = Vr0(T c).
We define below a generalisation of weighted means introduced in (Grabisch and Rusi-
nowska, 2013). It is more convenient, in this definition, to map Ai into [−1, 1] rather than
[0, 1], so that passing to probabilities requires to rescale aggregation functions as follows:
pi(S) :=
1
2 (Ai(1S) + 1).
Definition 11. The family of Generalised Weighted Means (GWM) is defined by aggregation
functions such that A(x1, . . . , xn) = f
−1
(∑n
j=1wjf(xj)
)
where f is a continuous automorphism
on [−1, 1], (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {−1, 1}n and w1, . . . , wn ∈ [−1, 1], called the weights, are such that∑n
i=1 |wj | = 1. Such aggregation functions are called a GWM aggregation function, and a
society where all agents aggregate according to a GWM function is called a GWM society.
The GWM aggregation function of an agent i is unbiased (See Remark 1) if and only if f is
an odd function.
Proposition 1 gives some precisions about the GWM aggregation functions. The last point
relates the distance-based with the GWM aggregation functions.
Proposition 1. Assume that i is an agent who aggregates opinions according to a GWM
aggregation function with weights (wij)j=1,··· ,n. Then:
(1) Mi 6= ∅ for all i and Assumption BC hold.
(2) φ(j → i) > 0 (resp. < 0) if and only if wij > 0 (resp. < 0).
(3) The sets in Ni and Yi are singletons.
(4) j is yes-influential on i, if and only if j is no-influential on i, if and only if wij 6= 0.
(5) Equality holds in Property 5.
(6) Ai is a distance-based aggregation if and only if |wji | = 1n for all j. In this case, its pole is
T = {j | wij > 0}.
The aggregation function represented in Figure 7 is a GWM function, with wi2 = w
i
3 =
1
3 and
wi1 = −13 . This aggregation function is also distance-based, and its pole is T = 23 (Proposition
1.(6)).
2.5.3 Characterisation of absorbing states and intervals
The characterisation of absorbing class in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013) extends well to
polarisations with negative influence. For example, Theorem 5 below is the adaptation of their
Theorem 3.
Theorem 5. Consider an influence process B based on aggregation functions A. Then, S is an
absorbing state if and only if:
(i) For any i ∈ N and Bi ∈ Mi, there exists no no-influential coalition T 4Bi Sc on some
i ∈ S.
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1 2 3
1312
123
23
∅
Ai(1S) = 1 at green states. Ai(1S) =
2
3 at blue states.
Ai(1S) =
1
3 at cyan states. Ai(1S) = 0 at red states.
f = Identity
Figure 7: A GWM aggregation function, which is also distance-based
(ii) For any i ∈ N and Bi ∈ Mi, there exists no yes-influential coalition T 4Bi S on some
i /∈ S.
When the polarisation of the society is not specified, the previous theorem is cumbersome
and of little use. Indeed, the difference with the conformist model is that we must specify a
different preorder for each agent8. Similar conditions can be produced for interval absorbing
classes (Theorem 4 in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013)):
Theorem 6. Consider an influence process B based on aggregation functions A and assume
that [S, S ∪K] is strongly connected. This interval is an absorbing interval if and only if:
(i) For any i ∈ N and Bi ∈ Mi, there exists no no-influential coalition T 4Bi Sc on some
i ∈ S.
(ii) For any i ∈ N and Bi ∈ Mi, there exists no yes-influential coalition T 4Bi S on some
i /∈ S ∪K.
3 Groups
3.1 Definition
There are two main approaches for defining groups. Either we adopt a topological approach
by considering cliques, conventions (Jackson and Storms, 2018), etc., that is, we exploit the
properties of the graph, or we base the definition of groups on the signs of influence. We adopt
the latter approach: our notion of groups is non-topological.
Definition 12. Let (N1, . . . , Ng) be a partition of N into g blocks of agents. These blocks are
called groups if
⋂
i∈Nk
Mi 6= ∅ for all k ∈ {1, . . . , g}. We write N(i) for the group that agent i
belongs to.
Agents belong to the same group if their aggregation functions can be polarised in the same
direction. There exists a common 4B that orientates the aggregation function of all agents
8However, in leadership models, introduced in the next subsection, a common preorder exists for all agents. In this
case, Theorem 5 becomes more useful.
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of the group. More precisely, they share a common set of agents who influence them in a
nonnegative way. However, as illustrated in Example 8, taking two agents i, j in a group, an
agent k may have a positive (or negative) influence for i but be irrelevant (no influence) for j,
and vice versa for another agent k′. This makes our definition of groups flexible.
Example 8. (Flexibility of the definition)M1 = [13, 123]; M2 = [12, 123]. Then, M1 ∩M2 =
{123} 6= ∅: Agents 1 and 2 can belong to the same group. However, Agent 3 has a strict positive
influence on Agent 1, while Agent 2 is irrelevant for him. For Agent 2, the roles are inverted:
Agent 3 is irrelevant and Agent 2 exerts a strict positive influence on himself.
The following constraint, not assumed by default in this paper, requires that no coarser
partition exists.
Assumption C: For all j, k ∈ {1, . . . , g},
⋂
i∈Nj∪Nk
Mi = ∅.
The partition of N into groups always exists, as shown by the following algorithm. (i) Start
from a partition of N into single agents. (ii) For each (k, p), check whether
⋂
i∈Np∪Nk
Mi 6= ∅. If
this is the case, merge groups p and k, and continue the process until no merging is possible
anymore. At the extreme, it can be that the partition is {{1}, . . . , {n}}. The partition is not
unique in general. To see this, note that we can always split a group into several groups. In
this case, one partition is coarser than the other. But even with Assumption C, the partition
of N into groups is not unique in general, as shown by Example 9.
Example 9. (Non-uniqueness of the partition) Let M1 := [∅, 1], M2 := [1, 123] and M3 :=
[23, 123]. We can partition N into {12, 3} or into {1, 23}.
It is important to note that agents of the same group do not necessarily exert positive
influence on each other. Indeed, in Example 9, φ(2 → 1) < 0. However, {12, 3} is a possible
partition into groups.
Definition 13. Let N = N1 ∪ . . .∪Ng be a partition into groups of N . We say that S is made
of blocks if there exists J ⊆ [1, g], called the corresponding indices of S, such that S is a union
of groups: S =
⋃
j∈J
Nj . We say that a class C is made of blocks if C is a singleton made of blocks,
or a cycle where each state is made of blocks, or a periodic class where the states Sj ,Kj of point
(iii) of Theorem 1 are made of blocks.
Recall that Theorem 2 states that Mi is an interval, i.e., of the form [Bi, Bi]. Assumption
BA (“blocks assumption”) states that the set of agents influencing a given agent is made of
blocks. It is not assumed by default in this paper.
Assumption BA: There exists a partition into groups such that for all i = 1, . . . , n,
Bi and Bi are made of blocks.
It can be shown that under Assumptions SI and BA agents of the same group have non-
negative influence on each other.
A particular case of partition where agents exert positive influence on each other is the one
of communitarian groups, i.e., communities of agents who not only have a positive perception
of agents from their group, but also a negative perception from agents of the other groups.
Example 10 introduces this notion.
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Example 10. A communitarian group is a group N ′ such that N ′ ∈ Mi for all i ∈ N ′. When
all groups are communitarian, we say that the society is communitarian. If the aggregation
function of an agent i is distance-based, then the pole is N(i). The agent says yes when the
state of the society is ‘not too far’ from its group. The case of two communitarian groups is
referred to in the literature as ‘anti-coordination model’ (Bramoulle´ et al. (2004), Bramoulle´
(2007) and Lo´pez-Pintado (2009)).
We end this section by making a remark on the relation between groups and absorbing
classes. Intuitively, one would expect that absorbing classes are somehow reflecting the structure
of the society into groups. Indeed, we think of groups as sets of agents behaving in the same
manner (hanging out together, wearing in the same manner, adopting the same opinion, etc.).
This is however not true in general in our framework. The main reason is that, as it can be
seen on Figure 6, the monotonicity collections, on which the definition of groups is grounded,
have no tight link with absorbing classes. In Section 5, we will see that it is however natural in
some sense that agents of the same group share the same opinion.
3.2 Analysis of the case g = 2
This subsection is devoted to the analysis of the case of two groups N1 and N2.
We do not impose Assumption C here, but we impose Assumption BA: each agent weighs
positively or negatively whole blocks of agents. Therefore, we can summarise the polarisation
of the society (Mi)i∈N by a signed matrix:
V :=
(
k11 k12
k21 k22
)
=
(
V1
V2
)
(23)
where kij = + if and only if Nj ⊆ Bi, and kij = − if and only if Nj ⊆ Bci , where i, j ∈ {1, 2},⋂
i∈N1
Mi = [B1, B1] and
⋂
i∈N2
Mi = [B2, B2]. If, for example k12 = +, then the whole group N2
has a positive influence on the whole group N1.
Four (up to symmetries) among the sixteen possible types of polarisations call for particular
interest: the conformist, mixed, leadership and communitarian polarisations, which we detail
below (see Table 1 for a summary of these types), together with some general properties about
convergence (they will be clarified in Section 5; see also Table 2 giving the transitions from
∅, N1, N2 and N under Assumption BC).
Conformist polarisation C
N ∈Mi for all i ∈ N
Mixed polarisation M1
N ∈Mi for i ∈ N1
∅ ∈ Mi for i ∈ N2
Leadership polarisation L1
N1 ∈Mi for all i ∈ N
Communitarian polarisation R1
N1 ∈Mi for i ∈ N1
N2 ∈Mi for i ∈ N2
Table 1: The C, M1, L1 and R1 polarisations.
(C) Conformist polarisations. VC :=
(
+ +
+ +
)
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Conformist polarisation C
∅ 1→ ∅
N
1→ N
Mixed polarisation M1
∅ 1→ N2
N
1→ N1
Leadership polarisation L1
N2
1→ ∅
N1
1→ N
Communitarian polarisation R1
N1
1→ N1
N2
1→ N2
Table 2: Some important transitions
N1 ⊆ B1, N1 ⊆ B2, N2 ⊆ B1 and N2 ⊆ B2. Hence, B1 = B2 = N : a partition into a
single group is possible. We already introduced the conformist polarisation as being one
where all agents are conformist, i.e., such that N ∈
⋂
i∈N
Mi. In particular, the society can
be partitioned into a single group. Generally speaking, opinions in conformist polarisations
are prone to reach an absorbing state.
(R1) Communitarian polarisations. VR :=
(
+ −
− +
)
N1 ⊆ B1, N2 ⊆ B2, N2 ⊆ Bc1 and N1 ⊆ Bc2. A communitarian polarisation is one with
two communitarian groups (cf. Example 10). It is such that φ(i→ j) ≥ 0⇔ φ(j → i) ≥ 0
and φ(i→ j) ≤ 0⇔ φ(j → i) ≤ 0. Generally speaking, polarisations R are prone to reach
an absorbing state.
(M1) Mixed polarisations. VM :=
(
+ +
− −
)
N1 ⊆ B1, N2 ⊆ B1, N1 ⊆ Bc2 and N2 ⊆ Bc2. A mixed polarisation is one where agents in
N1 are conformists (B1 = N) and agents in N2 are anti-conformists (B2 = ∅). (Grabisch
et al., 2019) investigates the dynamics of mixed polarisations. Generally speaking, mixed
polarisations are prone to cycling opinions.
(L1) Leadership polarisations. VL :=
(
+ −
+ −
)
N1 ⊆ B1, N2 ⊆ Bc1, N1 ⊆ B2 and N2 ⊆ Bc2. Hence, B1 = B2 = N1: a partition into a
single group is possible.
A leadership polarisation is such that
⋂
i∈N
Mi 6= ∅. In particular, the society can be par-
titioned into a single group. Taking B ∈ ⋂i∈NMi, the society can be split into B and
Bc: those who are unanimously followed (B), those who are unanimously disesteemed, in-
cluding by themselves (Bc). Writing
⋂
i∈N
Mi = [B,B], where B :=
n⋃
i=1
Bi and B :=
n⋂
i=1
Bi,
we have B ∩
n⋃
i=1
B
c
i = ∅ and Bc ∩
n⋃
i=1
Bi = ∅, from which we infer that agents in B are
weighted strictly negatively by no agents, and agents outside B are weighted strictly pos-
itively by no agents. Despite that the conformist polarisation is a particular leadership
polarisation, the dynamics and absorbing classes of the leadership polarisation are not a
simple transposition of the absorbing classes and dynamics of the conformist polarisation.
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Generally speaking, leadership polarisations are prone to cycling opinions.
Polarisations M2, L2 and R2 are defined by exchanging the roles of N1 and N2. If for M2
and L2, this does not change the type of polarisation, R2 can be considered as a new type which
we may call ‘anti-communitarianism’: agents weight positively agents outside their group, and
negatively agents of their group.
Example 11 analyses the four polarisations under majority influence.
Example 11. (Majority influence) We assume that the society can be partitioned into two
groups N1 and N2, that all agents are unbiased and that they aggregate according to distance-
based aggregation functions. For a conformist agent, this corresponds to following the majority.
For the other agents, the aggregation is also based on majority, but the opinions are positively
or negatively considered. Our assumptions impose Bi = Bi for all i ∈ N , i.e., the monotonicity
collections of any i is of the form Mi = {Bi} where: (i) Bi = N for conformist agents; (ii)
Bi = ∅ for anti-conformist agents; (iii) Bi = N(i) for communitarian agents. Distance-based
aggregation functions under majority influence (taking n odd), translate into P1i = V [n/2](Bi)
and P0i = V [n/2](Bci ). In Table 3 (Appendix B) are summarised the transitions from ∅, N1, N2
and N in each of the four polarisations. Without much surprise, cycles exist and there is no
‘continuity’ of absorbing classes with respect to n1n1+n2 . For example, a leadership polarisation
L1 (N1 ∈Mi for all i), under Assumption BC, has transitions N2 1→ ∅ 1→ ∅ when n1 > n2, and
N2
1→ ∅ 1→ N 1→ ∅ when n1 < n2. That is, a small change in the cardinalities of the groups can
provoke a jump from an absorbing state to a cycle.
We now investigate isomorphisms between the four important classes of polarisations, C,
M, R and L. To do this, we introduce the following transformations on the weighted transition
graphs:
Definition 14. Consider the transition S
p→ T and Z ⊆ N .
• The ∆(Z)-right transformation of the transition S p→ T is defined by S p→ T∆Z.
• The ∆(Z)-left transformation of the transition S p→ T is defined by S∆Z p→ T .
• The ∆(Z)-left-right transformation of the transition S p→ T is defined by S∆Z p→ T∆Z.
A vector of aggregation functions A’ is said to be obtained from A by a right/left/left-right
transformation when a right/left/left-right transformation is operated on all transitions of ΓA
to produce ΓA’.
We present here three related propositions in a row. Theorem 7 expresses the monotonicity
collections obtained from the ∆ transformations. Corollary 1 applies this theorem to the four
particular polarisations we are particularly interested in. Finally, Proposition 2 focuses on the
absorbing classes obtained from a left-right transformation; in particular, switching from the
absorbing classes of C to the ones of R, or from the ones of M to the ones of L (and vice versa),
is extremely simple.
Theorem 7. (Mi and ∆ transformations on transition graphs)
Assume that A’ is obtained from A by :
(i) a ∆(Z)-left transformation.
Then, MA’i = (MAi )∆(Z) for all i ∈ N .
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(ii) a ∆(Z)-right transformation.
Then: MA’i =MAi for all i /∈ Z, and MA’i = (MAi )(c) for all i ∈ Z.
(iii) a ∆(Z)-left-right transformation.
Then: MA’i = (MAi )∆(Z) for all i /∈ Z, and MA’i = (MAi )∆(Z
c) for all i ∈ Z.
Corollary 1. (Relations between the polarisations C, M, L and R) Assume that the society is
split into the groups N1 and N2.
(i) Let A’ be the aggregation function obtained from the aggregation function A with the
∆(N2)-right transformation. Then:
(a) The polarisation of A is conformist if and only if the polarisation of A’ is mixed.
(b) The polarisation of A is leadership if and only if the polarisation A’ is communitarian.
(ii) Let A’ be the aggregation function obtained from the aggregation function A with the
∆(N2)-left-right transformation. Then:
(a) The polarisation of A is conformist if and only if the polarisation of A’ is communi-
tarian.
(b) The polarisation of A is leadership if and only if the polarisation of A’ is mixed.
(iii) Let A’ be the aggregation function obtained from the aggregation function A with the
∆(N2)-left transformation. Then:
(a) The polarisation of A is conformist if and only if the polarisation of A’ is leadership.
(b) The polarisation of A is mixed if and only if the polarisation A’ is communitarian.
Proposition 2. (Left-right transformation)
Assume A’ to be the aggregation function obtained from A by a ∆(Z)−left-right transfor-
mation of its weighted transition graph. Then {S1, . . . , Sp} is an absorbing class of A if and
only if {S1∆Z, . . . , Sp∆Z} is an absorbing class of A’. If the polarisation of A is conformist or
communitarian, then there exists no periodic class of length k >
(
n
[n/2]
)
.
It follows from Corollary 1.(ii) and the first part of Proposition 2 that the dynamics of com-
munitarian and the conformist polarisations are the same and that the dynamics of leadership
and the mixed polarisations are the same. Therefore, the opinions in communitarian polarisa-
tions, like in the conformist polarisations, tend to reach an absorbing state, while the opinions
in leadership and mixed polarisations tend to end up into cycles.
Moreover, not only the conformist and the communitarian polarisations are prone to reaching
absorbing states, but also their cycles cannot be too long, as stated in the second part of
Proposition 2. The simple transformation of absorbing classes obtained in Proposition 2 is
specific to left-right transformations; in general, even though weighted transition graphs are
isomorphic, absorbing classes are not. To see this, consider Proposition 2, which states that
lengths of cycles in polarisations C and R do not exceed
(
n
[n/2]
)
; however we can show that there
exists leadership and mixed societies with cycles which exceed
(
n
[n/2]
)
. Therefore, C and M on
the one hand, and L and R on the other hand, are polarisations whose dynamics belong to
different universes.
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C M
L R
∆-left ∆-left
∆-right
∆-right
∆-left-right
Figure 8: Corollary 1 and Proposition 2: polarisations C and R on the one hand, and M and L on
the other hand, have the same dynamics.
4 Stability
We now investigate conditions under which opinions become stable. We refer to opinions as
being stable when an absorbing state is reached. Admittedly, this definition of stability is strong.
We could also define measures of stability. For example, we could investigate the invariants I(C)
of an absorbing class C, defined by:
I(C) :=
(⋂
S∈C
S
)
∪
(⋃
S∈C
S
)c
which is the set of agents who never change their opinion in C. Another approach to stability
could be to compute the average cardinality of states in C, and its variance. Finally, we could also
introduce a concept of asymptotic stability, where an absorbing state S would be asymptotically
stable when for any initial state S0 close enough to S, that is, such that |S∆S0| ≤ p for some
p, opinions starting from state S0 would end up in S with probability 1.
In social choice theory, the aggregation rules allowing for cycles (e.g., the Condorcet rule) are
regarded as undesirable. In our context, the societies where opinions do not reach an absorbing
state, are such that the outcome of the vote depends on the voting day. This remark motivates
investigating influence process which does not converge towards an absorbing state, i.e., by
Theorem 1, reaching a cycle or an interval collection. In what follows, we focus on cycles and
we leave aside the absorbing classes of the third kind, whose analysis is more complex.
At this level of generality, delivering necessary and sufficient conditions to forbid cycles
seems to be very complex. We only propose a few sufficient conditions.
Proposition 3. (Stability of opinions) If one of the following statements holds, then there is
no cycle.
(i) The society is GWM and Assumption SI holds.
(ii) Assumption SI holds and there exists i ∈ N such that Yi = Ni = {{1}, . . . , {n}}.
(iii) All aggregation functions are Boolean and for all i: P1i = Vp(N(i)), where p < min
nj 6= nl
|nj−
nl|.
(iv) The polarisation is conformist or communitarian, and all agents have distance-based ag-
gregation functions.
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(v) Each P∗i can be partitioned into P∗i = Pi∪P ′i such that the vector of Boolean aggregation
functions A’ verifies one of the previous statements, where A′i is determined by P ′1i :=
P1i ∪ Pi and P ′0i := P0i ∪ P ′i.
Corollary 2. If all aggregation functions are Boolean and if one of the statements of Proposition
3 holds, then the society converges towards an absorbing state.
Remark 2. Assumption SI, or its weaker version (φ(i→ i) ≥ 0 for all i), is involved in all points
(i) to (iv), either explicitly or implicitly. Though it is not a necessary condition for reaching an
absorbing state, it is difficult to bypass it when designing sufficient conditions.
5 Entropy
5.1 Motivation
At this stage of the paper, (Mi)i∈N does not give a clue, neither about the absorbing classes,
nor about which of the three dynamics described by Theorem 1 will be reached. Conversely,
we cannot extract the monotonicity collections from the absorbing classes. For example, we
know that cycles are possible in a conformist polarisation (Grabisch and Rusinowska, 2013).
However, this is a rather exceptional and quite atypical situation, as a conformist polarisation
leads most of the time to convergence in an absorbing state. This suggests to redirect the focus
toward a statistical approach which would allow us to say, for example, that absorbing states
are more natural than cycles in a conformist model. In short, we would like to define a notion
of natural dynamics.
We expect that natural dynamics could help for the prediction of opinion. If indeed we can
see a few transitions (typically, time series, pools of opinions), we would like to be able to say
something like: ‘These opinions must have been produced by a society made of 12% of anti-
conformist agents’ or: ‘The society should be composed of six communitarian groups of this and
that size’, and then use this guess to predict the future opinions. This is what econometricians
do when computing the best fit for their models. In the same spirit, we introduce in this section
a measure of disorder or abnormality, called entropy, which we use to extract information on
the polarisation of the society and to predict future opinions.
Since our question is situated at the observation level, the problem of counterfactuals arises.
Observing a transition from state S to state T does not give bS,T . To dodge this issue and focus
our analysis on the mechanism we are interested in, we make the following assumption:
Assumption. In Section 5, we assume that all aggregation functions are Boolean and non constant.
Therefore, all transitions are deterministic.
5.2 Definition and properties
Consider a transition S
1→ T and assume that φ(i → j) > 0. Then, we expect j to adopt
i’s opinion, in the sense that, if for example i ∈ S, then j ∈ T . By the same token, if i /∈ S
and φ(i → j) > 0, we expect j to follow i’s opinion, and therefore, that j will say no at the
next period: we expect j /∈ T . These implications actually fail in general, but we consider
these failures as some kind of abnormality, hence our definition of entropy as the number of
abnormalities over the n2 pairs (i, j):
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Definition 15. (Entropy of a sure transition)
Assume that S
1→ T . Let m
S
1→T be the Boolean function onN×N defined by mS 1→T (i, j) = 1
(an ‘abnormality’) if and only if one of the following assertions holds: (i) φ(i → j) > 0 and
i ∈ S and j /∈ T ; (ii) φ(i → j) > 0 and i /∈ S and j ∈ T ; (iii) (i) φ(i → j) < 0 and i ∈ S and
j ∈ T ; (iv) φ(i→ j) < 0 and i /∈ S and j /∈ T .
The entropy of S
1→ T is defined by: µ(S 1→ T ) :=
∑
i,j
m
S
1→T (i, j).
The entropy of a cycle9 C: S1 1→ . . . 1→ Sk 1→ S1, is defined by µ(C) := 1
k
k∑
p=1
µ(Sp
1→ Sp+1).
The normalised entropy of µ is µ0 := µ/n
2.
Since transitions are deterministic, as it is assumed in this section, we can unambiguously
write mS and µ(S) instead of m
S
1→T and µ(S
1→ T ) and refer to entropy as being defined on
states10.
In information theory, entropy accounts for the degree of unpredictability (Shannon, 1948).
In thermodynamics, the interpretation of entropy in terms of order and disorder traces back to
Clausius and Helmholtz (Clausius (1879), Anderson (2005)). Being a count of abnormalities,
our terminology is in accordance with this idea. As a consequence, entropy measures how
consistent, and therefore how informative, is a transition about the underlying society.
Example 12 illustrates this idea. Proposition 6 shows that entropy has nothing to do with
signs of influences, since entropy is left unchanged under some transformations which affect the
signs of influence. When applying a ∆-transformation on the influence graph, both the transi-
tions and the monotonicity collections are transformed. As a consequence, m (and therefore µ)
remains unchanged.
Example 12. In conformist societies, entropy is null at the trivial absorbing states ∅ and N .
Unanimity is consistent with the idea we have about conformism. In communitarian societies
with two groups N1 and N2, the entropy is null at states N1 and N2. In this context, the
dichotomy of opinions is some kind of collective success.
9The definition of entropy on a collection of transitions as a sum over the transitions is to avoid combinatorial
complexity.
10Contrary to physics where a ‘photography of the system’ suffices to see in which direction it will evoluate, observing
a state S without any knowledge on A does not give a clue about the evolution of opinions, hence the definition of
entropy on transitions. The entropy on non-deterministic transitions (which, as announced, is not investigated in this
paper) can be defined as follows:
µ(S → T ) :=
∑
i,j
f(bS,T )mS,T (i, j) =
∑
i,j
m(S→T,i,j)=1
f(bS,T )
where f is an increasing function on ]0, 1]. We suspect that f = log would be the most appropriate: (i) this function
is consistent with the fact that S
0→ T is not observable; (ii) since log(1) = 0, we cannot use the non-deterministic
entropy index in the deterministic case, which is consistent with the fact that entropy in information theory and
statistical thermodynamics are not formulated in terms of threshold models; (iii) a low bS,T is consistent with an
abnormality mS→T (i, j) = 1 and a high bS,T is consistent with mS→T (i, j) = 0, but the former (a combination of
two abnormal events) is more informative than the latter (a combination of two normal events). Hence, a concave
function is more appropriate; (iv) log(bS,T ) =
∑
i∈T
log(pi(S)) +
∑
i/∈T
log(1− pi(S)) obtains an expression which recalls
the Shannon entropy and the Gibbs entropy formula, where the sum of the −pi log(pi) is replaced by the sum of the
log(pi) on the domain of abnormalities.
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Property 6. (Invariance of entropy under a ∆-transformation)
Let A’ be obtained from A by a ∆(Z)-transformation, for some Z ⊆ N . Then, mA’S′ (i, j) =
mAS (i, j) for all S, i, j, where S
′ = S for the right transformation, and S′ = S∆Z for a left or
left-right transformation.
Since in the next subsection we intend to use a minimum entropy principle, it is useful to
have an idea on the range of the values taken by µ. First, note from the definition that the
more irrelevant agents are, the lower the entropy is. For this reason, models with distance-based
aggregation functions (complete networks of influences, in particular, anonymous aggregation
functions) typically exhibit high entropy transitions, while models with interval collections for
P0i and P1i typically exhibit low entropy transitions. When there are no irrelevant agents,
simulations show (like in Examples ?? and 15) that the normalised entropy in complete graphs
of influence can be around 13 or more. We may wonder if there exist transitions with no
abnormalities, or, on the contrary, transitions with n2 abnormalities. Theorem 8 answers ‘yes’
to the first question and ‘no’ to the second one.
Theorem 8. (Extremal values of µ)
(1) µ(S) = 0 for all S ∈ 2N if and only if each agent has a boss. In this case, we have for each
i ∈ N :
Bi =
⋂
S
1→T
T3i
S =
⋂
S
1→T
T 63i
Sc (24)
Bi =
⋃
S
1→T
T3i
S =
⋃
S
1→T
T 63i
Sc (25)
(2) There exists no transition S
1→ T such that µ(S) = n2. In other words, for any transition
S
1→ T , at least one of the following statements holds:
• There exist j ∈ S and i ∈ T such that φ(j → i) > 0.
• There exist j ∈ Sc and i ∈ T c such that φ(j → i) > 0.
• There exist j ∈ S and i ∈ T c such that φ(j → i) < 0.
• There exist j ∈ Sc and i ∈ T such that φ(j → i) < 0.
5.3 The minimal entropy principle and its applications
Let us now show how to use the entropy index in practical problems. From the observation of a
collection O of one or more transitions, we want to extract some information about the society.
For example, we might want to choose which polarisation is the most likely: D1 or D2. The
minimal entropy principle is the following: D1 is more consistent with the observations O than
D2 if and only if µD1(O) < µD2(O), where the subscript Di in µ indicates that the entropy has
been computed under polarisation Di.
We assume that the observer only observes absorbing classes. Assuming that absorbing
classes are associated with a minimal entropy is not a mathematical fact, but this assumption
boils down to assuming that the society observed is a society in the strong meaning of the term,
that is, contains agents cooperating in a project. In other words, agents who consent to live
together have the common goal of minimising the number of abnormalities, collaborating to
clean out the chaos.
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5.3.1 Natural dynamics
In Example 13 we compare the trivial absorbing states in the conformist model which are ∅
and N , with the other ones. Intuitively, the trivial absorbing states are more expected to be
observed than non-trivial ones. The entropy principle justifies this intuition and leads to the
concept of natural dynamics, which will be further illustrated in Example 14. In this example,
we will justify in particular the general statements given in Section 3.2. In both examples, we
take the simplest shape of aggregation functions: the majority influence (see Example 11).
Example 13. (Anonymous influence in a conformist model)
Assume that the society is conformist and that all aggregation functions are distance-based
(this is to ensure that there exists no irrelevant agent). Then for any absorbing state S ∈ 2N :
µ(S) = 0.0︸︷︷︸
S×S
+ s.(n− s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
S×Sc
+ (n− s).s︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sc×S
+ 0.0︸︷︷︸
Sc×Sc
= 2s(n− s) (26)
which is null if and only if S ∈ {∅, N}. Hence, non trivial absorbing states in the conformist
model lead to higher entropy than the trivial ones. Unanimity is more natural than dichotomy.
Let us now examine the case of cycles, taking one of length 2: S1
1→ S2 1→ S1. Then we can
show that the entropy of this cycle is:
µ(S1
1→ S2 1→ S1) = 2(|S1 × Sc2|+ |Sc1 × S2|) > 0
where × is the cartesian product of two sets. For S1 = S2, we recover the computations for the
absorbing state.
Generally speaking, agents of a given group have no reason to end up adopting the same
opinion, but they tend to do so when the entropy of the society is low. To see why, assume
that the group considered is conformist, which by Proposition 6 induces no loss of generality.
These agents exert positive influence on each other, and therefore can be considered as forming
a conformist sub-society. We know by Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013) that such societies can
have strange opinion dynamics like cycles, and non-trivial absorbing states and classes. However,
by applying the minimum entropy principle, we can see that these cases are eliminated as having
high entropy values. The natural dynamics is to converge in one of the trivial absorbing states.
Therefore, in general, it is natural for agents of the same group to adopt similar opinions.
Example 14 pursues this investigation by a converse approach. While Example 13 attributed
a natural absorbing class to a given polarisation, Example 14 attributes a natural polarisation
to a given absorbing class.
Example 14. (Natural dynamics in the majority influence model under the ‘four polarisations’)
Let us continue Example 11, whose absorbing classes are all summarised in Table 3 of
Appendix B. Without loss of generality, consider n1 > n2. Under the assumptions of Example
11, we can show that µ(S) = µ(Sc). Hence, we can restrict ourselves to examining the absorbing
states ∅ 1→ ∅ and N1 1→ N1, and the cycle ∅ 1→ N1 1→ ∅. By Property 6, with a left-right-
transformation, µC(S) = µR2(S∆N1) and µL2(S) = µM2(S∆N1). Therefore, comparing N1
1→
N1 in (M1) and (R1), is like comparing ∅ 1→ ∅ in (C) and (L1). Finally, the following points (i)
and (ii) suffice to make an exhaustive analysis of the majority influence case with two groups
and the four polarisations: (C), (L), (M) and (R).
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(i) Assume that the absorbing state ∅ 1→ ∅ is observed. This transition can occur in the
conformist polarisation (C) and the leadership polarisation (L1). Which society is the
most likely: (C) or (L1)?
– µC(∅) = 0,
– µL1(∅) = n1n2.
The observer will infer from the entropy principle that the most likely society is a con-
formist one. More generally, an absorbing state is more likely, either in a conformist or a
communitarian society, than in a leadership or a mixed society.
(ii) Assume that the cycle N1
1→ ∅ 1→ N1 is observed, which can occur in the communitarian
polarisation (R2), i.e., an ‘anti-communitarian society’, and the mixed polarisation (M2),
i.e., where agents in N1 are anti-conformists. Which society is the most likely: (R2) or
(M2)?
– µR2(∅ 1→ N1 1→ ∅) = nn2 + (n21 + n22),
– µM2(∅ 1→ N1 1→ ∅) = 0 + 2n1n2.
The observer will infer from the comparison of entropy values that the most likely society
is a mixed one. More generally, a cycle is more likely, either in a leadership or a mixed
society, than in a conformist or a communitarian society.
5.3.2 Information extraction and opinions prediction
Information extraction and opinion prediction are tightly related to each other. Typically, a
statistician, by a wise guess, opts for, e.g., a Poisson distribution to model a phenomenon
and computes which parameter fits best the data by a maximum likelihood estimation. An
econometrician, by a wise guess, chooses a set of explanatory variables and a regression provides
the most suitable coefficients. Entropy will be used exactly in the same manner. By a wise guess,
the observer first chooses the most suitable polarisation of the society, and then determines the
most suitable characteristics of the groups by minimising the entropy. Here are two examples.
Example 15. (Opinion prediction in a mixed polarisation)
Let the society be the one of Figure 9. The observer does not know the aggregation functions
of agents, he only observes the transition 1
1→ 23. The next transition is 23 1→ 1, but this is
also unknown to the observer. This is what he will try to guess, using the minimal entropy
principle.
The assumptions of the observer are the following:
(i) All aggregation functions are distance-based: P1i = Vpi(Ti) for any i, where Ti ∈ {∅, N}.
(Mixed society).
(ii) pi = p for all i.
(These assumptions are actually verified by the true society). We call N c the set of conformist
agents and Na the set of anti-conformist agents. In the true society, we have Na = 23. The
observer computes the entropy in each of the eight candidate partitions (N c, Na) of the society.
We can show that:
• if Na ∈ {∅, 12, 13}, then µ(1) = 5.
• if Na ∈ {1, 2, 3, 123}, then µ(1) = 4.
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Agent 1 Agent 2
Agent 3
1 12 2 33
13 1323 12
123 123
12 23
∅ ∅
1 12 23 3
13 1323 12
123 123
12 23
∅ ∅
In this example, the mixed society produces a cycle, and this cycle is made of blocks.
Green states: Ai(1S) = 1. Red states: Ai(1S) = 0.
Figure 9: A mixed society (N1 = 1 and N2 = 23) with distance-based aggregation functions.
• if Na = 23, then µ(1) = 3.
From the minimal entropy principle, the most likely partition is Na = 23 and N c = 1 (guess
is correct). Then p must be computed; since 1
1→ 23, the only possibility is p = 1 (correct). The
observer has now recovered the correct aggregation functions, from which he can deduce that
the next transition is 23
1→ 1.
Example 16. (Recovering the groups) Let us present two case studies where the observer aims
at recovering information from the society that produced some given transitions.
The hypotheses of the observer are the following:
(i) The society is communitarian. The partition into groups is (N1, . . . , Ng) with n1 ≤ . . . ≤
ng.
(ii) All aggregation functions are distance-based.
(iii) Observed states are made of blocks.
Since the society is assumed to be communitarian and since (ii) excludes the presence of
irrelevant agents, we can show that the entropy of any transition S
1→ T is:
µ(S) =
g∑
j=1
(|(Nj ∩ T )× (S∆Nj)| + |(Nj \ T )× (S∆Nj)c|) . (27)
Situation 1. The absorbing state S
1→ S is observed.
Situation 2. A cycle is observed. To simplify the analysis, let us take S
1→ N 1→ S for some
S ⊂ N .
30
 
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2019.24
Solving Situation 1. From (iii), we can write S =
⋃
j∈J
Nj ; that is, J is the set of indices
corresponding to S. From (27) with T = S:
µ(S) =
∑
j
(|(Nj ∩ S)× (S∆Nj)| + (Nj \ S)× (S∆Nj)c|)
=
∑
j∈J
nj
∑
k∈J\{j}
nk +
∑
j /∈J
nj
∑
k/∈J∪{j}
nk
=
∑
j,k∈J
j 6=k
njnk +
∑
j,k/∈J
j 6=k
njnk
(28)
where by convention nk = 0 if k ∈ ∅. This expression is null (and therefore minimal) if and only
if J and Jc contain only one group, i.e., if we have g = 2, N1 = S and N2 = S
c. This solution
is intuitive: the society is simply anti-coordinating. There are two groups: one says yes, the
other one says no.
Solving Situation 2. From (iii), we can write S =
⋃
j∈J
Nj . From (27) with S
1→ N and
N
1→ S:
µ(S) =
∑
j∈J
|Nj × (S \Nj)|+
∑
j /∈J
|Nj × (S ∪Nj)|
=
∑
j∈J
nj(s− nj) +
∑
j /∈J
nj(s+ nj)
(29)
and:
µ(N) =
∑
j∈J
|Nj × (N \Nj)| +
∑
j /∈J
|Nj ×Nj |
=
∑
j∈J
nj(n− nj) +
∑
j /∈J
n2j
(30)
So that:
µ(C) =
∑
j∈J
nj(s− nj) +
∑
j /∈J
nj(s+ nj) +
∑
j∈J
nj(n− nj) +
∑
j /∈J
n2j
=
∑
j∈J
nj(n+ s− 2nj) +
∑
j /∈J
nj(s+ 2nj)
(31)
Finding the partition that minimises µ(C) is equivalent to finding the partition that min-
imises the following quantity: ∑
j /∈J
n2j −
∑
j∈J
n2j . (32)
By the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, we have for any partition of the society:
∑
j /∈J
n2j ≥ n− s
and
∑
j∈J
n2j ≤ s2, where equality holds if and only if Jc is made of n − s singletons and J is
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made of a single element of size s. Replacing in (31) gives µ∗R(C) = s(n− s) + (n− s)(s+ 2) =
2(s + 1)(n − s) (= 2µ(S) = 2µ(N)). The solution of this minimisation problem seems to be
of bad quality: obtaining a partition made of one group equal to S and a fragmentation of Sc
into singletons sounds weird. This is not surprising. As shown in Example 14, a cycle is not a
natural dynamics for communitarian polarisations. Taking a communitarian polarisation as an
assumption to explain a cycle was not a judicious choice.
Let us rather assume that the polarisation is a mixed one, partitioned into conformist and
anti-conformist agents (N c, Na), aggregating with distance-based aggregation functions. We
must determine which one of the following two cases minimises µ; (i) Na = S; (ii) Na = Sc.
We report below the entropy values in both cases.
(i) If Na = S, then µ(S) = s2 + (n− s)2 and µ(N) = n2.
(ii) If Na = Sc, then µ(S) = 2s(n− s) and µ(N) = 0.
For any S, taking N c = S and Na = Sc minimises the entropy of the cycle S
1→ N 1→ S,
equal to µ∗M (C) = 2s(n− s). We can also see that µ∗M (C) < µ∗R(C) for any S ∈ 2N \ {N}, which
shows that choosing a mixed polarisation to explain this cycle is a more judicious choice.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we developed a tractable model of opinion diffusion under mutual influence. Any
kind of diffusion can be hosted by our formalism, as long as: (i) alternatives are binary; (ii)
decision making is reversible; (iii) updating is synchronous and (iv) the process is Markovian;
(v) aggregation functions are fixed.
Section 2 showed that negative influence can be treated similarly as the positive one, by
choosing an appropriate pre-order for each agent. The difficulty inherent to models with negative
influence is not the negative influence per se but the possible heterogeneity in such pre-orders.
However, the characterisation of absorbing classes is the same as in the conformist model.
Little assumptions on aggregation functions were imposed, the only indispensable one being
that Mi 6= ∅ for all i, which means the influences received by the agents do not qualitatively
depend on the state of the world. Perhaps surprisingly, Assumption SI, stating that agents
weigh positively their own opinion, does not play an important role in the formulation of this
model. The absence of utility functions, replaced by aggregation functions playing the role of
best responses, makes the model very handy.
In Section 3, we proposed a notion of groups which is entirely non-topological: agents
belong to the same group if they qualitatively receive the same influences. We uncovered
simple transformations between four important polarisations: conformism, anti-conformism,
leadership and communitarianism (anti-coordination). However, agents of the same groups
do not necessarily end up adopting the same opinion. This inconvenient fact motivates the
introduction of a measure of abnormalities, called entropy, developed in Section 5. This index
measures how consistent dynamics with aggregation functions of agents is. For example, a
natural idea is that agents of the same group end up adopting the same opinion, or that
there are no cycling opinions in conformist models. Though this does not hold in general, it
does however in societies characterised by a low entropy. We introduced the minimal entropy
principle, which can be applied to information extraction and opinion predictions. The strategy
is similar to the minimal entropy principle. A given shape of the society is assumed ex-ante and
the most likely parameters of the society are recovered from the observations.
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A significant improvement of this model would be to study the properties of its asynchronous
version. Most of the tools of this article can be exported easily: aggregation functions, yes/no
influential coalitions, influence graphs, monotonicity collections, polarisations and groups. One
important question is: would it be possible to obtain the dynamics of the asynchronous version
of the model from the dynamics of the synchronous one? This question is essential, since the
synchronous model is more tractable than the asynchronous one, while the asynchronous model
is more realistic. Some dynamics, however, can be proved to be similar in both models, which
suggests that the gap between the two approaches, actually, is not so wide.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof. (Property 1) Inverting the identity (1). For any S, pi(S) can be recovered from B as
follows. For any S ∈ 2N , A(1S) is of the form A(1S) = (1T ,xK ,0(T∪K)c) with xK ∈ (0, 1)K .
Hence, there exists T,K such that S
1→ [T, T ∪ K]. Noticing that Ai(1S) = pi(S) is the
probability that the next state contains i: pi(S) =
∑
T ′3i
T ′∈[T,T∪K]
bS,T ′ .
(This property can be found in Grabisch and Rusinowska)
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Proof. (Property 2) Assume that fB(S) ⊆ fB(S′). Since the lattice isomorphism fB is an
involution, this is equivalent to S 4B S′. SinceB ∈Mi, Ai(1S) ≤ Ai(1S′). That is, A′i(1fB(S)) ≤
A′i(1fB(S′)). Since fB(2
N ) = 2N , we have proved that S ⊆ S′ ⇒ A′i(1S) ≤ A′i(1S′), which implies
that N ∈M′i.
Proof. (Property 3)
(⇒) Since Mi 6= ∅, there exists B ∈ Mi. Let j ∈ N . Either j /∈ B, and then Ai(1S∪j) ≤
Ai(1S) for all S ∈ 2N , or j ∈ B and then, Ai(1S) ≤ Ai(1S∪j) for all S ∈ 2N .
(⇐) Assume that there exists j ∈ N such that (a) there exists S such that Ai(1S∪j) > Ai(1S),
and that: (b) there exists S′ such that: Ai(1S′∪j) < Ai(1S′). If there exists B ∈M, then either
j ∈ B, which contradicts (b), or j /∈ B, which contradicts (a).
Proof. (Theorem 2)
For any sets A,B ∈ 2N , we write [[A,B]] := [A ∩B,A ∪B].
Step 1. Assume that B1, B2 ∈Mi. Then, [[B1, B2]] ⊆Mi.
S
S ′
F5
F6F1
F3
F2
F4
T B1
B2
Figure 10: T ∈ [[B1, B2]]
Let T ∈ [[B1, B2]]. Assume that S 4T S′ and let:
• S1 := S ∪ F1 with F1 = (S∆S′) ∩ (T \B2)
• S2 := S1 ∪ F2 with F2 = (S∆S′) ∩ (B1 ∩B2)
• S3 := S2 ∪ F3 with F3 = (S∆S′) ∩ (T \B1)
• S4 := S3 \ F4 with F4 = (S∆S′) ∩ (B2 \ T )
• S5 := S4 \ F5 with F5 = (S∆S′) ∩ (B1 ∪B2)c
• S′ = S5 \ F6 with F6 = (S∆S′) ∩ (B1 \ T )
Noticing respectively that: F1 ∈ B1; F2 ∈ B1; F3 ∈ B2; F4 ∈ Bc1; F5 ∈ Bc1 and F6 ∈ Bc2,
we deduce the following inequalities: Ai(1S) ≤ Ai(1S1) ≤ Ai(1S2) ≤ Ai(1S3) ≤ Ai(1S4) ≤
Ai(1S5) ≤ Ai(1S′).
Step 2. Mi = [Bi, Bi].
The previous step shows that Mi is an interval. From the definition of Bi and Bi, we
actually have Mi = [Bi, Bi].
Step 3. φ(j → i) = 0 ⇔ [B \ j ∈Mi ⇔ B ∪ j ∈Mi].
If φ(j → i) = 0, then by Property 3: for all S ∈ 2N : Ai(1S\j) = Ai(1S∪j). In particular:
B \ j ∈ Mi ⇔ B ∪ j ∈ Mi. Converse: Assume that φ(j → i) 6= 0. We want to show that
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the equivalence [B \j ∈Mi ⇔ B∪j ∈Mi] does not hold. By Property 3 and without loss
of generality, Ai(1S\j) ≤ Ai(1S∪j) for all S, and exists S∗ such that Ai(1S∗\j) < Ai(1S∗∪j).
Let B ∈ Mi; let us show that necessarily j ∈ B (and therefore, that there is no B ∈ Mi
such that B \ j ∈ Mi). Assume that j ∈ Bc. Then Ai(1S∪j) ≤ Ai(1S\j) for all S. In
particular for S = S∗, then Ai(1S∗∪j) ≤ Ai(1S∗\j), a contradiction.
Step 4. Assume that B1, B2 ∈Mi. For all j ∈ B1∆B2: φ(j → i) = 0. Conversely, if φ(j → i) = 0,
there exists B1, B2 ∈Mi: j ∈ B1∆B2.
(⇐) Let B1, B2 ∈ Mi. By the Step 1: [[B1, B2]] ⊆ Mi. Let j ∈ (B1 ∪ Bi) \ (B1 ∩ B2):
then for any B ∈ [[B1, B2]]: [B \ j ∈Mi ⇔ B ∪ j ∈Mi]. Result follows from the converse
direction of the previous step. (⇒) If φ(j → i) = 0, then for any B ∈ Mi, by Step 3:
either B 3 j, and therefore: B \ j ∈ Mi, or j /∈ B, and therefore B ∪ j ∈ Mi. In both
cases we have found B1, B2 ∈Mi such that j ∈ B1∆B2.
Step 5. φ(j → i) = 0 if and only if j ∈ Bi \Bi.
From Bi \Bi = Bi∆Bi = {j | ∃B1, B2 ∈Mi : j ∈ B1∆B2} and the previous step.
Step 6. If there exists B ∈Mi such that j ∈ B, then φ(j → i) ≥ 0.
Assume that φ(j → i) < 0 and j ∈ B ∈ Mi. By φ(j → i) < 0, there exists S∗ such that
Ai(1S∗∪j) < Ai(1S∗). By j ∈ B ∈Mi, it holds that S ≺B S∪j for and all S. In particular
S∗ ≺B S∗ ∪ j, which implies Ai(1S∗) ≤ Ai(1S∗∪j), a contradiction. By the previous step,
the inequality is strict if and only if j ∈ Bi.
Proof. (Property 5) For all S ∈ Ni and j ∈ S: Ai(1Bi∆S) < Ai(1Bi∆(S\j)) = 1; therefore, φ(j →
i) 6= 0. For all S ∈ Yi and j ∈ S: Ai(1Bci∆S) > Ai(1Bci∆(S\j)) = 0; therefore, φ(j → i) 6= 0.
That is: ⋃
Yi ∪
⋃
Ni ⊆ {j | φ(j → i) 6= 0} = Bi ∪Bci , (33)
where the last equality comes from Theorem 2.
Let us establish the reverse inclusion for Boolean aggregation functions. Assume that i is
conformist, which, from Property 2, is without loss of generality. Let j such that φ(j → i) 6= 0,
i.e., since the agent is conformist, that φ(j → i) > 0. There must exist S such that Ai(1S∪j) = 1
and Ai(1S) = 0. Therefore there exists a yes-influential coalition in ↓ (S ∪ j) that contains j,
i.e., there exists S′ ⊆ S \ j such that (S ∪ j) \ S′ ∈ Yi. By the same token, there exists S′ such
that (N \ S) \ S′ is a no-influential coalition, with j /∈ S and j /∈ S′, that is, a no-influential
coalition that contains j. Finally, equality holds in the previous inclusion.
(Moreover, we notice that
⋃
S∈Yi
S =
⋃
S∈Ni
S =
⋃
S∈Ni∪Yi
S).
Proof. (Theorem 3) By definition, P0i (resp. P1i ) uniquely determines Yi (resp. Ni). We must
show, conversely, that Yi (resp. Ni) uniquely determines P0i (resp. P1i ). Let us show that for
any B ∈ Mi: P∗i ∪ P1i =
⋃
Y ∈Yi
↑B Y and P∗i ∪ P0i =
⋃
M∈Ni
↓B (N \M). Let B ∈ Mi. We have
P∗i ∪ P1i ⊇
⋃
Y ∈Yi
↑B Y , otherwise the monotonicity conditions would be violated. Conversely,
P∗i ∪ P1i ⊆
⋃
Y ∈Yi
↑B Y ; indeed, if there existed S /∈
⋃
Y ∈Yi
↑B Y such that Ai(1S) > 0, then there
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would exists Y ∈ ↓B S such that Y ∈ Yi, i.e., S ∈ ↑B Y , which is absurd. (Similar proof for
no-influential coalitions).
Proof. (Theorem 4)
(1) S → T if and only if Ai(1S) > 0 for all i ∈ T and Ai(1S) < 1 for all i /∈ T . For Bi ∈ Mi,
from the monotonicity of Ai with respect to the 4Bi order and (from Assumption BC) the
fact that Ai(1Bci ) = 0, we deduce that Ai(1S) > 0 if and only if there exists a yes-influential
coalition Y on i with Y ⊆ S∆Bci . On the other hand, since Ai is monotonous with respect
to the 4Bi order and (from Assumption BC) Ai(1Bi) = 1; therefore, Ai(1S) < 1 if and
only if there exists a no-influential coalition M on i with M ⊆ S∆Bi.
(It is not hard to show that Theorem 4.(1) actually recovers all the Yi and the Ni).
(2) S
1→ T is equivalent to Ai(1S) = 1 if i ∈ T and Ai(1S) = 0 if i /∈ T . If Y ⊆ S∆Bci (by (10),
this is equivalent to Y∆Bci 4Bi S) is yes-influential on i /∈ T , 0 < Ai(1Y ∆Bci ) ≤ Ai(1S) =
0, a contradiction. By the same token, if M ⊆ S∆Bi (by (10), this is equivalent to
M∆Bi 4Bci S, i.e., M∆Bi <Bi S) is no-influential on i ∈ T , 1 = Ai(1S) ≤ Ai(1M∆Bi) < 1,
a contradiction.
Proof. (Proposition 1)
(1) to (4) are adapted from Proposition 2 of Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013). (5) is a direct
consequence of (4) and (3). For (6), note that if there exists j, k with |wij | 6= |wik|, then
Ai(1T∆j) 6= Ai(1T∆k).
Proof. (Theorem 7)
We will use the following straightforward property:
Property 7. For any S1, S2, B, Z ∈ 2N :
S1 4B S2 ⇔ S1∆Z 4B∆Z S2∆Z (⇔ fZc(S1) 4fZc (B) fZc(S2)). (34)
(i) Let S1, S2 be any two states in the weighted transition graph characterized by A. Let
B ∈ MAi . Then, in the weighted transition graph characterized by A’ obtained from A
by a left transformation: S1∆Z 4B S2∆Z ⇒ A′i(1S1) ≤ A′i(1S2). By Property 7, S1 4B∆Z
S2 ⇒ A′i(1S1) ≤ A′i(1S2). Therefore, B∆Z ∈ (Mi)A’. We have established MA’i ⊇
(MAi )∆(Z); the left-transformation being a symmetry, the same reasoning establishes the
reverse inclusion.
(ii) For any S ∈ 2N , there exists T,K such that S 1→
A
[T, T ∪K]. By Property 1:
pAi (S) =
∑
T ′3i
T ′∈[T,T∪K]
bAS,T ′ (35)
Let A’ obtained by a ∆(Z)-right transformation. By definition, for all S, T ∈ 2N : bAS,T =
bA’S,T∆Z . That is:
S
1→
A’
[[T∆Z, (T ∪K)∆Z]] (36)
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with:
pA’i (S) =
∑
T ′3i
T ′∈[[T∆Z,(T∪K)∆Z]]
bA’S,T ′ . (37)
We write RA(S, i) the collection of sets T ′ ∈ [T, T ∪K] containing i, for a given transition
S
1→
A
[T, T ∪K]. We rewrite:
pAi (S) =
∑
T ′∈RA(S,i)
bAS,T ′ (38)
Noticing that:
RA’(S, i) =
{ (RA(S, i))∆(Z) if i /∈ Z
([T, T ∪K] \ RA(S, i))∆(Z) if i ∈ Z , (39)
we rewrite:
pA’i (S) =

∑
T ′∈(RA(S,i))∆(Z)
bA’S,T ′ if i /∈ Z∑
T ′∈([T,T∪K]\RA(S,i))∆(Z)
bA’S,T ′ if i ∈ Z
(40)
If i /∈ Z, then pA’i = pAi . If i ∈ Z, then pA’i = 1− pAi .
We get that finally for all i and B ∈MAi :
S 4B S′ ⇒
{
pA’i (S) ≤ pA’i (S′) if i /∈ Z
pA’i (S) ≥ pA’i (S′) if i ∈ Z
(41)
Therefore, B ∈ MA’i for i ∈ Z and Bc ∈ MA’i for i /∈ Z. That is, MA’i ⊇ MAi for all
i /∈ Z, and MA’i ⊇ (MAi )(c) for all i ∈ Z. As in the previous point, the reverse inclusions
hold too.
(iii) The monotonicity collection of a weighted transition graph obtained from a right-left
transformation stems from the right and the left ones.
Proof. (Corollary 1)
It is a direct application of Theorem 7. For example, let us prove that the transformation of a
polarisation M1 by a ∆(N2)-right transformation is a polarisation R1.
A polarisation M1 is such that N ∈ Mi for i ∈ N1 and ∅ ∈ Mi for i ∈ N2. Apply a ∆(N2)
right transformation on the weighted transition graph determined by A (Property 1): from
Theorem 7, for i ∈ N1: N∆N2 = N1 ∈ MA’i and for i ∈ N2: ∅∆N2 = N2 ∈ MA’i , i.e., the
polarisation obtained is a communitarian one.
Proof. (Proposition 2)
It holds that S
1→
A
T ⇔ S 1→
A’
T . Let CA be an absorbing class in ΓA. Therefore: (i) CA is
strongly connected if and only if (CA)∆ is strongly connected; (ii) there is no arc from S ∈ CA
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to some T /∈ CA if and only if there is no arc from S ∈ (CA)∆ to some T /∈ (CA)∆. Therefore,
(CA)∆ is an absorbing class in ΓA’ (∆ being a symmetry, the reverse inclusion holds too).
Conformist and communitarian polarisations. Assume that A is the aggregation vector
of communitarian polarisation where the two groups are N1 and N2. Let the periodic class:
[T1, T1 ∪ H1] 1→ [T2, T2 ∪ H2] 1→ . . . 1→ [Tk, Tk ∪ Hk] 1→ [T1, T1 ∪ H1], where some Hp are
possibly empty. Let A’ obtained from A with a ∆(N2)-left-right transformation. Then the
polarisation of A’ is conformist and, by the first point and Corollary 1, absorbing classes of
Γ and Γ′ are linked by the relation: ‘C is an absorbing class in Γ if and only if C∆ is an
absorbing class of Γ′’. Consider therefore the following periodic class in a conformist model:
[S1, S1 ∪K1] 1→ [S2, S2 ∪K2] 1→ . . . 1→ [Sk, Sk ∪Kk] 1→ [S1, S1 ∪K1]. Sperner’s Theorem states
that the upper bound of the length of an antichain with the set order is
(
n
[n/2]
)
. Therefore if
we show that S1, S2, . . . , Sk must be incomparable with the order ⊂, then we will have proved
that
(
n
[n/2]
)
is an upper-bound on the length of the periodic classes. Assume that Sp ⊂ Sq
for some p, q (the equality is impossible since sets of a periodic class must be incomparable),
then Sp
1→ [Sp+1, Sp+1 ∪ Kp+1] and Sq 1→ [Sq+1, Sq+1 ∪ Kq+1] with Sp+1 ⊆ Sq+1 and Kq+1
possibly empty (where actually Sp+1 ⊂ Sq+1 because the class is periodic). Iterating q − p
times: Sq ⊂ S2q−p. Let m be such that (m+ 1)q −mp ≡ 0[k]. Iterating m times gets:
Sp ⊂ Sq ⊂ S2q−p ⊂ . . . ⊂ S(m+1)q−mp = Sp (42)
which is absurd.
Proof. (Proposition 3)
In all these points, we assume that S1
1→ S2 1→ . . . 1→ Sk 1→ S1 with k ≥ 2.
(i) Let W j0 := {i | wji = 0}, so that φ(i → j) = 0 ⇔ i ∈ W j0 . Let the transition Sp 1→ Sp+1.
In a GWM model (from Proposition 1.(1)+(2)), we have for all p and all j ∈ Sp+1:
Sp \W j0 =
⋃
wjk>0
k and for all j /∈ Sp+1: Sp \W j0 =
⋃
wjk<0
k. By assumption SI, wjj > 0 for
all j ∈ N . Therefore: Sp+1 ⊆ Sp \W j0 for all j ∈ Sp+1, which implies: Sp+1 ⊆ Sp, where
the inclusion is actually strict, since the transition is embedded into a cycle. But this
holds for all p, which implies S1 ⊂ S1, a contradiction.
(This is an adaptation of Proposition 1.(iii) in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013)).
(ii) Yi = Ni = {1, . . . , n} implies thatMi contains a single set Bi, and that Ai(1S) ∈ {0, 1} if
and only if S ∈ {Bi, Bci }. There is only one candidate cycle to examine: Bi 1→ Bci 1→ Bi.
By Assumption SI, i /∈ Bci . Since Bi 1→ Bci , we have: pi(Bi) = 0. Since Mi = {Bi}, this
implies pi(S) = 0 for all S ∈ 2N ; but pi(Bci ) = 0 contradicts Bci 1→ Bi and i ∈ Bi.
(This is an adaptation of Proposition 1.(ii) in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2013)).
(iii) Since agents of the same group have the same aggregation function, the following cycle
is made of blocks: S1
1→ S2 1→ . . . 1→ Sp 1→ S1, and we call J1, . . . , Jp the corresponding
indices of the (Sq)q=1..p. This succession of p transitions imposes the following conditions:{
Sq ∈ Vp(N(i)) for all i ∈ Sq+1
Sq /∈ Vp(N(i)) for all i /∈ Sq+1 (43)
Since i ∈ Sq if and only if (i) ∈ Jq, the previous conditions translate into:
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
∑
j∈Jq
nj − n(i) ≤ p for all i such that (i) ∈ Jq+1∑
j∈Jq
nj + n(i) > p for all i such that (i) /∈ Jq+1
(44)
(Recall that (ni)i∈[1,g] are the cardinalities of the groups).
Hence S1
1→ S2 1→ . . . 1→ Sk 1→ S1 is a cycle if and only if for all i ∈ N :
p ∈
max
q∈[1,k]
∑
j∈Jq
nj − min
j∈Jq+1
nj
 ; min
q∈[1,k]
∑
j∈Jq
nj + min
j /∈Jq+1
nj
− 1
 .
(where the interval [a, b] is empty if b < a).
Since for any succession of transitions distinct from ∅ 1→ ∅ (impossible in a cycle), it holds
that max
q∈[1,k]
∑
j∈Jq
nj − min
j∈Jq+1
nj
 > 0, we have therefore:
min
nj 6= nl
|nj − nl| ≤ max
q∈[1,k]
∑
j∈Jq
nj − min
j∈Jq+1
nj
.
If p is strictly lower than min
nj 6= nl
|nj − nl|, then all cycles are impossible.
(iv) Let us show it for conformist polarisations; by Proposition 2, this holds in communitarian
polarisations too.
In a society where agents have distance-based aggregation functions, |S| = |S′| and S 1→ T
implies S′ 1→ T . Therefore states must be of different cardinality within a cycle; hence
there exists Si, Sj such that |Si| < |Sj |. But this implies |Si+1| ≤ |Sj+1|, because all
agents are conformist. Iterating k times and using a similar argument as in the proof of
Proposition 2, we get |Si| < |Si|, which is absurd.
(This result was established in Fo¨rster et al. (2013), Proposition 3).
(v) If there is no cycle in a society where the set of sure transitions is larger, then there is no
cycle in the primitive society.
Proof. (Corollary 2) When aggregation functions are Boolean, absorbing classes are either cycles
or absorbing states. Therefore, if there are no cycles, there are only absorbing states.
Proof. (Property 6) This is an application of Corollary 1. Recall that for MAi = [Bi, Bi], we
have (MAi )(c) = [B
c
i , B
c
i ]. Moreover, (MAi )∆(Z) = [B′i, B
′
i] where:
• B′i := (Bi \ Z) ∪ (Bci ∩ Z) and:
• (B′i)c := (Bci \ Z) ∪ (Bi ∩ Z).
It holds that φ(i → j) = 0 ⇔ φ′(i → j) = 0 for any of the three transformations. Let us
study the case (i) i ∈ S and j /∈ T . The cases (ii) i ∈ S and j ∈ T , (iii) i /∈ S and j /∈ T ; (iv)
i /∈ S and j ∈ T are analogous.
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• (i) Left-transformation (S 1→ T transformed into S∆Z 1→ T ).{
i ∈ S \ Z
(j /∈ T ) ⇒

sign(φ′(i→ j)) = sign(φ(i→ j))
i ∈ S∆Z
(j /∈ T )
.
{
i ∈ S ∩ Z
(j /∈ T ) ⇒

sign(φ′(i→ j)) = −sign(φ(i→ j))
i /∈ S∆Z
(j /∈ T )
In both cases, m’S∆Z(i, j) = mS(i, j).
• (ii) Right-transformation. (S 1→ T transformed into S 1→ T∆Z).{
i ∈ S
j ∈ Z \ T ⇒

sign(φ′(i→ j)) = −sign(φ(i→ j))
i ∈ S
j ∈ T∆Z{
i ∈ S
j ∈ (T ∪ Z)c ⇒

sign(φ′(i→ j)) = sign(φ(i→ j))
i ∈ S
j /∈ T∆Z
In both cases, m’S(i, j) = mS(i, j).
• (iii) Left-right-transformation. Composition of a left and a right-transformation.
Proof. (Theorem 8) Some lemmas need first to be exposed.
Lemma 1. Assume that µ(S) = 0 for all transition S
1→ T .
(a) φ(j → i) > 0 if and only if for each transition S 1→ T , [j ∈ S ⇔ i ∈ T ].
(b) φ(j → i) < 0 if and only if for each transition S 1→ T , [j /∈ S ⇔ i ∈ T ].
Proof. (Lemma 1) Let us prove (a), the point (b) being analogous. (⇒) If S 1→ T with j ∈ S
and i /∈ T , then mS(j, i) = 1. If j /∈ S and i ∈ T , then mS(j, i) = 1 too. (⇐) By contraposition;
two cases: φ(j → i) = 0 and φ(j → i) < 0. Assume that φ(j → i) = 0 and let S 1→ T be such
that j ∈ S and i ∈ T . Then we have also S \ j 1→ T . That is, the equivalence [j ∈ S ⇔ i ∈ T ]
does not hold. Assume that φ(j → i) < 0. Since mS(j, i) = 0 for all S 1→ T , i and j, then
necessarily either j ∈ S and i /∈ T , or j /∈ S and i ∈ T ; the equivalence [j ∈ S ⇔ i ∈ T ] does
not hold either.
Lemma 2. If P1i is a interval, then Yi = {Bi ∪B
c
i} and Ni = {{j} | j ∈ Bi ∪Bci}.
If P0i is a interval, then Yi = {{j} | j ∈ Bi ∪B
c
i} and Ni = {Bi ∪Bci}.
Proof. (Lemma 2) Let us prove it for P1 being an interval; the results are reversed for P0.
• S ∈ Yi if and only if Ai(1Bci∆S) > 0 (equal to 1 since Ai is Boolean) and Ai(1Bci∆S′) = 0
for all S′ ⊂ S. Since P1i is an interval, P1i =Mi. Therefore, Ai(1T ) = 1⇔ Bi ⊆ T ⊆ Bi.
This implies S = B
c
i∆Bi = B
c
i ∪Bi.
• Let S ∈ Ni. We have Ai(1Bi∆S) = 0 and Ai(1Bi∆S′) = 1 for all S′ ⊂ S. That is,
Q := [[Bi∆S,Bi]] \ (Bi∆S) ⊆ P1i . If |S| ≥ 2, then there exists Bi∆S1, Bi∆S2 distinct
sets of Q linked to Bi∆S in the Hasse diagram (S1, S2 ⊂ S). But then, the fact that
Bi∆S = (Bi∆S1) ∧Bi (Bi∆S2) contradicts that P1i is a interval. Hence we must have
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|S| = 1. The collection of sets of P1i linked to Bi in the Hasse diagram is made of the
sets Bi∆j, where the singleton j belongs to Bi \Bi. We finally can write Ni = {{i} | i ∈
(Bi \Bi)c} = {{i} | i ∈ Bci ∪Bi}.
Lemma 3. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) P0i = (P1i )(c).
(ii) P0i and P1i are intervals.
(iii) P1i is an interval of cardinality 2n−1.
(iv) P0i is an interval of cardinality 2n−1.
(v) M(c)i =Mci .
(vi) For all i ∈ N , |{j | φ(j → i) 6= 0}| = 1.
(vii) For each i, there exists j such that j is a boss for i.
In particular, under one of these points, P1i =Mi = (P0i )(c) = ((Mi)c)(c).
Proof. (Lemma 3) (i) ⇒ (ii), (iii) and (iv) are obvious. Let us prove (i) ⇒ (v). Since P1i
is an interval and Ai is Boolean, we have Mi = P1i . Therefore, (P0i )c = (P0i )(c) implies
(Mi)c = (Mi)(c). Let us prove (v) ⇒ (i). We have [Bi, Bi]c = [(Bi)c, (Bi)c], then P1i = Mi
and (Mi)c are of equal cardinalities. Therefore, (Mi)c = P0i . Let us prove (ii) ⇒ (vi). From
Lemma 2; Yi and Ni are equal, made of a single state, which state is made of a single agent.
That is, |j | φ(j → i) 6= 0| = 1 for all i. Let us prove (vi) ⇒ (v) For a given i, let us assume
without loss of generality that the agent having a non-null influence on it exerts a positive one.
Therefore, Mi = [j,N ]. We have (Mi)c = [∅, N \ j] = (Mi)(c). Equivalence between (vi) and
(vii) is straightforward.
We can now prove Theorem 8.
(1) • First part.
(⇐) Let S 1→ T and i, j arbitrary. Assume that φ(j → i) < 0 and mS(j, i) = 1
(the case φ(j → i) > 0 is analogous). By Lemma 1, either j ∈ S and i ∈ T , or
j /∈ S and i /∈ T . In the first case, we have S ∈ P1i = Mi = [Bi, Bi], and therefore
φ(j → i) ≥ 0 (absurd). The second case (i /∈ T ) is obtained from Lemma 3: we have
S ∈ P0i = (Mi)c = (Mi)(c) = [B
c
i , B
c
i ]; since j /∈ S, this implies φ(j → i) ≥ 0 too
(absurd).
(⇒) Assume that µ(S) = 0 for all S 1→ T . Then for a given transition S 1→ T :
(a) φ(i→ j) > 0⇒ i ∈ S and j ∈ T , or i /∈ S and i /∈ T .
(b) φ(i→ j) < 0⇒ i ∈ S and j /∈ T , or i /∈ S and i ∈ T .
Assume that there exists k, S1 such that S1 ∈ P1k \ Mk. Then, there exists S2 ∈
P1k \ Mk such that [[S1, S2]] * P1k ; in particular, S1 6= S2 and, since Mk 6= ∅,
S3 := S1 ∧Bk S2 ∈ P0k . Consider two chains of sets linked in the Hasse diagram, i.e.,
such that |Sr∆Sr+1| = 1 and |S′r′∆S′r′+1| = 1 for all r = 3 . . . p:
S3 4S1 S4 4S1 . . . 4S1 Sp 4S1 S1
and:
S3 4S2 S′4 4S2 . . . 4S2 S′p 4S2 S2
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Let q be such that Ak(1Sq) = 0 and Ak(1Sq+1) = 1, and q
′ such that Ak(1S′
q′
) = 0 and
Ak(1S′
q′+1
) = 1. Let j := Sq∆Sq+1 and l := S
′
q′∆S
′
q′+1 and notice that j 6= l. Without
loss of generality, assume that j ∈ Sq+1 and l ∈ S′q′+1. Therefore: φ(j → k) > 0 and
φ(l → k) > 0. Because of (a): (i) j ∈ S ⇒ Ak(1S) = 1 and j /∈ S ⇒ Ak(1S) = 0: (ii)
l ∈ S ⇒ Ak(1S) = 1 and l /∈ S ⇒ Ak(1S) = 0. Therefore, j and l are bosses for k;
but there cannot be two distinct bosses for an agent. Therefore, P1i is an interval for
all i ∈ N . By the same token, P0i is an interval for all i. By Lemma 3, this implies
P0i = (P1i )(c).
• Second part. We have Mi = P1i for all i ∈ N .
From Lemma 1 and Theorem 2:
Bi =
 ⋂
S
1→T
T3i
S
 ∪
 ⋂
S
1→T
T 63i
Sc
 (45)
Bi = N \

 ⋂
S
1→T
T 63i
S
 ∪
 ⋂
S
1→T
T3i
Sc

 (46)
From the first part, since the P0 and P1 are intervals, they are both of cardinalities
2n−1. In particular, none of them contains two complement sets. Therefore, S 1→
T ⇔ Sc 1→ T c. This implies:
⋂
S
1→T
T3i
S =
⋂
S
1→T
T 63i
Sc and:
⋂
S
1→T
T 63i
S =
⋂
S
1→T
T3i
Sc,
which simplifies (45) and (46) and gives the forms announced.
(2) Let us show that assuming (A) to (D) together leads to a contradiction.
For all j ∈ S and i ∈ T : φ(j → i) ≤ 0. (A)
For all j ∈ Sc and i ∈ T c: φ(j → i) ≤ 0. (B)
For all j ∈ Sc and i ∈ T : φ(j → i) ≥ 0. (C)
For all j ∈ S and i ∈ T c: φ(j → i) ≥ 0. (D)
These assumptions on φ can be expressed by sets inclusions w.r.t Bi and Bi:
(A) and (C) together give S ∈ (Mi)(c) for all i ∈ T .
(B) and (D) together give S ∈Mi for all i ∈ T c.
Step 1. P1i ⊇ (↑ S) ∪ (↓ S) for all i ∈ T and P0i ⊇ (↑ S) ∪ (↓ S) for all i /∈ T .
Let S∗, S∗∗ be such that S∗ ⊆ S ⊆ S∗∗.
(A) implies S∗ 1→ T ′ for some T ′ ⊇ T (because for i ∈ T : Ai(1S∗) ≥ Ai(1S) = 1).
(B) implies S∗∗ 1→ T ′′ with T ′′ ⊆ T (because for i ∈ T c: Ai(1S∗∗) ≤ Ai(1S) = 0).
(C) implies S∗∗ 1→ T ′′′ for some T ′′′ ⊇ T (because for i ∈ T : Ai(1S∗∗) ≥ Ai(1S) = 1).
(D) implies S∗ 1→ T ′′′′ for some T ′′′′ ⊆ T (because for i ∈ T c: Ai(1S∗) ≤ Ai(1S) = 0).
(A) yields S∗ ∈ P1i for all i ∈ T .
(B) yields S∗∗ ∈ P0i for all i /∈ T .
(C) yields S∗∗ ∈ P1i for all i ∈ T .
(D) yields S∗ ∈ P0i for all i /∈ T .
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This holds for any S∗, S∗∗ such that S∗ ⊆ S ⊆ S∗∗. Therefore, for any set U of any
chain from ∅ to N passing through S and for any i ∈ T : Ai(1U ) = 1; in other words,
P1i ⊇ (↑ S) ∪ (↓ S). By the same token, for any i /∈ T : Ai(1U ) = 0; in other words,
P0i ⊇ (↑ S) ∪ (↓ S).
Remark 3. All these collections inclusions are actually strict. If indeed equality held, let
us say for some i ∈ T , then we would get Mi = {S}, that is, Bi = S. But this would
contradict φ(j → i) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ S.
Step 2. S ∈Mi for all i ∈ T and S ∈ (Mi)(c) for all i /∈ T .
Let i ∈ T (the case i /∈ T is analogous) and assume that S /∈Mi.
Since: (i) aggregation functions are Boolean; (ii) [[S,U ]] ⊆ P1i for all U ∈ (↑ S)∪(↓ S) and
(iii) S /∈Mi, there exists X1 such that X1 ∈ P1i \ ((↑ S)∪ (↓ S)) with [[S,X1]] * P1i . Since
[[S,X1]] * P1i , there exists S′ ∈ [[S,X1]] ∩ P0i . The set S′′ := S′ \ Bi belongs to [[S,X1]]
too and, since S′ ∈ P0i , it holds also that S′′ ∈ P0i . Let Y := (S1 ∪X1) ∩ (Bi)c. Since by
(A) we have S ⊆ (Bi)c, on the one hand we have Y ∈ (↑ S), which by Step 1 implies that
Y ∈ P1i . On the other hand we have Y 4B S′′ for some B ∈ Mi. Since S′′ ∈ P0i , this
implies Y ∈ P0i , a contradiction.
Conclusion.
By Step 2, φ(j → i) ≥ 0 for all j ∈ S and i ∈ T and φ(j → i) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ S and i /∈ T .
Because of (A) and (D), this will imply that φ(j → i) = 0 for all j ∈ S and i ∈ N . Since:
• S ∈Mi for all i ∈ T is equivalent to Sc ∈M(c)i for all i ∈ T .
• S ∈M(c)i for all i /∈ T is equivalent to Sc ∈Mi for all i /∈ T .
we will have also that φ(j → i) = 0 for all j /∈ S and i ∈ N . In other words, all agents
would be irrelevant on all agents, which would contradict that the aggregation functions
are non constant.
Appendix B. The ‘four polarisations’. Transitions from
∅, N1, N2 and N under majority influence
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